Transfer of Power and the Crisis of Dalit Politics in India, 1945-47 by Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar
Modern Asian Studies 34, 4 (2000), pp. 893–942.  2000 Cambridge University Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
Transfer of Power and the Crisis of Dalit
Politics in India, 1945–47
SEKHAR BANDYOPADHYAY
Victoria University of Wellington
Introduction
Ever since its beginning, organized dalit politics under the leadership
of Dr B. R. Ambedkar had been consistently moving away from the
Indian National Congress and the Gandhian politics of integration.
It was drifting towards an assertion of separate political identity of
its own, which in the end was enshrined formally in the new constitu-
tion of the All India Scheduled Caste Federation, established in
1942. A textual discursive representation of this sense of alienation
may be found in Ambedkar’s book, What Congress and Gandhi Have
Done to the Untouchables, published in 1945. Yet, within two years, in
July 1947, we find Ambedkar accepting Congress nomination for a
seat in the Constituent Assembly. A few months later he was
inducted into the first Nehru Cabinet of free India, ostensibly on the
basis of a recommendation from Gandhi himself. In January 1950,
speaking at a general public meeting in Bombay, organized by the
All India Scheduled Castes Federation, he advised the dalits to co-
operate with the Congress and to think of their country first, before
considering their sectarian interests. But then within a few months
again, this alliance broke down over his differences with Congress
stalwarts, who, among other things, refused to support him on the
Hindu Code Bill. He resigned from the Cabinet in 1951 and in the
subsequent general election in 1952, he was defeated in the Bombay
parliamentary constituency by a political nonentity, whose only
advantage was that he contested on a Congress ticket.1 Ambedkar’s
chief election agent, Kamalakant Chitre described this electoral
debacle as nothing but a ‘crisis’.2
1 For details, see M. S. Gore, The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar’s Political
and Social Thought (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London, 1993), pp. 177–95.
2 Unsigned letter (probably written by Kamalakant Chitre) to B. R. Ambedkar,
14 Jan. 1952, Dr B. R. Ambedkar Papers, National Archives of India [hereafter
NAI].
0026–749X/00/$7.50+$0.10
893
S E K H A R B A N D Y O P A D H Y A Y894
These developments obviously raise many questions. What did, in
the first place, lead to the unexpected alliance of 1947, between
Ambedkar and the Congress—an association that lasted less than
four years and was shaky and vulnerable from the very beginning?
And then, did this alliance have anything to do with the ‘crisis’ that
Chitre talked about or was itself indicative of a ‘crisis’ of dalit
politics?
Gail Omvedt has shown in her book, Dalits and the Democratic Revolu-
tion, that the ‘Brahman-bourgeois Congress’ had been appropriating
dalit politics during the last phase of colonial rule, and this was
weakening Ambedkar’s political base. But in her opinion, it was ‘the
final declaration of independence and partition [that] led him
decisively to throw his lot with the Congress’. His decision ‘to negoti-
ate with the Congress’ was based also on his ‘preference for a strong
and centralised state’, as opposed to the ‘extreme’ federation being
proposed by the Muslim League.3 For Eleanor Zelliot, on the other
hand, the alliance was a triumph of the Congress integrationist polit-
ics, a ‘remarkable act of political generosity’, through which ‘[a]ll
the varying strains of Gandhi–Congress–Untouchable situation
seemed to come together’.4 M. S. Gore offers a smiliar, but a more
instrumentalist explanation. With the Muslim question seemingly
resolved, the Congress now sought to tackle the untouchability issue
by co-opting its most articulate leader. For Ambedkar too, this
offered an opportunity to do something for his community from
within the government, and not in confrontation with the Congress;
and the offer had no strings attached.5 On the other extreme, Arun
Shourie’s recent iconoclastic expose´, Worshipping False Gods, seeks to
explain this compromise in terms of a ‘forget and forgive’ policy of
the Congress and depicts Ambedkar begging Jagjivan Ram for a cab-
inet position6—an insinuation which, as one of Shourie’s numerous
critics has pointed out, is either untrue or exaggeration.7
3 Gail Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit Move-
ment in Colonial India (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London, 1994), p. 304.
4 Eleanor Zelliot, ‘Congress and the Untouchables, 1917–1959’, in Richard
Sisson and Stanley Wolpert (eds), Congress and Indian Nationalism (Berkeley, 1988),
pp. 193–4; also see her From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar Movement
(Delhi, 1992), pp. 172–3.
5 Gore, The Social Context, pp. 180–3.
6 Arun Shourie, Worshipping False Gods: Ambedkar, and the Facts Which Have Been
Erased (New Delhi, 1997), pp. 55, 57.
7 S. M. Gaikwad, ‘Ambedkar and Indian Nationalism’, Economic and Political
Weekly, 7 March 1998, pp. 515–18.
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Was it, therefore, just the magic of independence or a sudden
spate of generosity or a streak of wise pragmatism that closed all
fissures in India’s national body politic? Or was it also the compul-
sions of a political situation created by the transfer of power process
between 1945 and 1947 that precipitated such an unusual alliance?
None of the existing studies answers the second question. It is not
enough to say that the Congress appropriated dalit politics during
the last years of colonial rule; it is also essential to understand what
made that appropriation possible. This present essay will argue that
the ‘crisis’ which Kamalakant Chitre mentions in his letter of 1952,
originated much earlier and was made transparent by the transfer
of power process. It was this crisis which paved the way for the alli-
ance of 1947 and when that connection broke down four years later,
organized dalit politics had to confront the crisis once again.
What was then, the nature of this crisis? First, it involved a crisis
of patronage. Ever since 1917/18 the dalit leaders looked towards the
colonial state for patronage; but suddenly now they discovered that
this patronage was shifting. But more serious was a crisis of representa-
tion or legitimacy. The transfer of power process defined for India her
political mainstream, ie., the Congress, and identified the minorities,
primarily on the basis of religion e.g., Muslim or Sikh, and thus mar-
ginalized all other streams of politics and political identities. The All
India Scheduled Castes Federation led by Ambedkar, because of its
electoral debacle in 1946, was no longer recognized as a legitimate
representative of the dalits. The privilege of representing them was
now conferred on the Congress and Ambedkar found no place what-
soever in the official negotiations for the transfer of power. He now
had very little choice, non-co-operation with the Congress would
mean a total political marginalization. But the question is, how did
dalit politics arrive at such a crisis point where it was unable to
withstand the mounting political pressures and was threatened with
nothing less than extinction.
The purpose of this essay is to unravel the process through which
this dual crisis for dalit politics developed during the late colonial
period. It would argue that to some extent it was the inevitable result
of the transfer of power process, in which Ambedkar and his Federa-
tion were unwittingly caught and they had no power to reverse it.
But to some extent, it was also due to their own organizational weak-
ness to confront the hegemonic power of the Congress and an ideolo-
gical failure to interrogate the dominant majoritarian version of
nationalism. This is a facet of dalit history which has not been
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properly assessed either in the hagiographic literature on Ambedkar
or in the partisan literature on dalit politics, which have almost uni-
versally tended to ignore this rather unpleasant saga of the last days
of colonial rule.8 On the other hand, such questions have received far
less satisfactory discussion in literature that has delved in outright
denigration of Ambedkar, such as Arun Shourie’s recent controver-
sial book, which in a bid to retrieve ‘erased’ facts, has only misrepres-
ented them.9
Organization and Fragmentation
The pan-Indian dalit movement at an organized level started in
192610 at the All India Depressed Classes Leaders’ Conference held
at Nagpore, where the All India Depressed Classes Association was
formed, with Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah as its first elected president.
Dr Ambedkar, who did not attend the conference, was elected one
of its vice-presidents. Thereafter, in 1928 it was proposed that Dr
Ambedkar would be elected president at the annual conference of
the Association to be held in Delhi. He accepted the invitation, but
later failed to attend the session, whereupon, Rajah was again
elected president a second time. Ambedkar’s friend, Dr Solanki, tried
to move a resolution to have two presidents, both Rajah and Ambed-
kar at the same time. But the resolution failed, as there was no
seconder. Sometime later, Ambedkar resigned from this Association
and in 1930 at a conference in Nagpore, founded his own All India
8 See, for example, Mathew Thomas, Ambedkar, Reform or Revolution (New Delhi,
1991); W. N. Kuber, Ambedkar: A Critical Study (New Delhi, Revised edition, 1991);
Kusum Sharma, Ambedkar and Indian Constitution (New Delhi, 1992); K. N. Kadam
(ed.), Dr B. R. Ambedkar: the Emancipator of the Oppressed (Bombay, 1993); Mohammad
Shabbir (ed.), B. R. Ambedkar: Study in Law & Society (Jaipur and New Delhi, 1997).
Perhaps the only exception is Dhananjay Keer, Dr. Ambedkar, Life and Mission
(Bombay, 1990).
9 Of particular interest here is the subtitle of his book: Ambedkar and the Facts
Which Have Been Erased. For full reference, see note 6.
10 The dalit movement at regional or provincial levels had of course started much
earlier. Individual groups such as the Mahars of Maharashtra, the Nadars of Tamil-
nad, the Ezhavas of Kerala or the Namasudras of Bengal had started organizing
from the early years of the twentieth century. One may perhaps also mention the
Depressed Classes conference at Bombay in November 1917, under the chairman-
ship of Justice Sir Narayan Ganesh Chandavarkar, as a very rudimentary beginning
of a movement at the national level. This was followed by another conference in
Baroda in early 1918. For more details on these conferences, see Zelliot, ‘Congress
and the Untouchables, 1917–1959’, pp. 182–4.
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Depressed Classes Congress, as a ‘rival’ organization.11 The frag-
mented structure of leadership of the organized dalit politics in India
was thus set at the very beginning of its chequered career.
As for its political philosophy, there was also a major difference
from the very beginning. In his inaugural address at Nagpore in
August 1930, Ambedkar took a very clear anti-Congress and a mildly
anti-British position, thus setting the tone for the future course of
history.12 It was in his evidence before the Simon Commission that
Ambedkar first demanded separate electorate, in the absence of uni-
versal adult franchise, as the only means to secure adequate repres-
entation of the depressed classes.13 During the first session of the
Round Table Conference, he gradually moved further towards this
position, as many of his comrades were in its favour.14 Following this,
an All India Depressed Classes Leaders’ Conference in Bombay on
19 May 1931 formally endorsed this position by resolving that the
Depressed Classes must be guaranteed ‘their right as a minority to
separate electorate’.15 It was on this point that Ambedkar had a
major show-down with Gandhi at the second session of the Round
Table Conference. By early 1932, however, this issue of electorate
had created a major rift within the Depressed Classes camp, as the
M. C. Rajah group was staunchly in favour of joint electorate. The
Working Committee of the latter’s All India Depressed Classes Asso-
ciation in a meeting in February 1932 deplored Dr Ambedkar’s
demand for separate electorate and unanimously supported joint
electorate with the Hindus, with the provision of reservation of seats
on the basis of population. An agreement, known as the ‘Rajah–
Munje Pact’, was also reached to this effect between Rajah and Dr
B. S. Munje, the President of the All India Hindu Mahasabha.16 This
shows that there was never a consensus on separate electorate
11 ‘Salvation of the Depressed Classes Lies in Joint Electorates’, by G. M.
Thaware, Assistant General Secretary, All India Depressed Classes Association, 31
March 1932, Ambedkar Papers, File No. 3–9 Part 1, Roll No. 2, Nehru Memorial
Museum and Library, New Delhi [hereafter NMML].
12 Presidential Address, All India Depressed Classes Congress, First session,
Nagpur, 8–9 August 1930, by Dr B. R. Ambedkar, Ambedkar Papers, File No. 9,
Part 1, Roll 3, NMML.
13 Gore, The Social Context, p. 111.
14 Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and Backward Classes in India (Delhi,
1984), p. 31.
15 Government of India [hereafter GI], Reforms Office, File No. K. W. of 35/31–
R, NAI.
16 The Hindustan Times, 29 Feb. 1932, GI, Reforms Office, File No. 111/32-R, NAI.
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among the depressed classes, as claimed by Ambedkar at the Round
Table Conference.
The differences persisted when the Communal Award recognized
the right to separate electorate for the Scheduled Castes, and
Gandhi embarked on his epic fast to get it revoked. Rajah, as he
later claimed in a letter to Gandhi, in spite of considerable ‘pressure’
from ‘high Government authorities including the Viceroy, the Home
Member and the Indian Law Member’, persuaded the representat-
ives of his community, ‘in spite of opposition of a certain section’, to
accept the provisions of the Poona Pact.17 Ambedkar had little option
but to accept a compromise on joint electorate, with Gandhi conced-
ing the demand for reserved seats. For the time being it seemed as
if all conflicts had been resolved. There was a nationwide interest in
the temple entry movement and Gandhi’s Harijan campaigns for the
removal of untouchability took off with much fanfare. Even, although
temporarily, there was co-operation between Gandhi and Ambedkar
in relation to the activities of the Harijan Sevak Sangh. The provi-
sions of the Poona Pact were later incorporated into the Government
of India Act of 1935. Although there were many critics of the Pact,
there were still others who fancied it to be an ultimate nationalist
resolution of the untouchability question.
But disunity reappeared very soon. First of all the differences
between Gandhi and Ambedkar were too deep-rooted to be resolved
so easily and soon Gandhi’s religious approach clashed with Ambed-
kar’s interest in fundamental structural change.18 The Congress and
Ambedkar again started moving in different directions. While
Gandhi’s Harijan Sevak Sangh was involved in social issues, the other
Congress leaders had little interest in his mission. They needed a
political front to mobilize dalit voters to win the reserved seats pro-
vided for in the new Act. For this purpose, they founded in March
1935 the All India Depressed Classes League, with Jagjivan Ram, a
prote´ge´ of the Bihar Congress leader Rajendra Prasad, as the presid-
ent, and the Punjab dalit leader, Prithvi Singh Azad as the general
secretary. Ambedkar, on the other hand, founded in 1936 his Inde-
pendent Labour Party, in a bid to mobilize the poor and the untouch-
ables on a broader basis than caste alone. In the election of 1937,
his party won spectacular victory in Bombay, winning 11 of the 15
17 M. C. Rajah to Gandhi, 12 March 1937, M. C. Rajah Papers, NMML.
18 For more details, see Gore, The Social Context, pp. 139–44; Zelliot, From
Untouchable to Dalit, pp. 150–72.
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reserved seats. It did well also in the Central Provinces and Berar.
But the election results also revealed that outside western India, his
influence was still limited. The Congress won in 73 out of 151
reserved seats all over India, which meant that they too did not enjoy
the support of the majority of the dalit voters, who voted in 78 other
constituencies for a variety of other parties and independents. This
indicates, if nothing else, at least a highly fragmented nature of the
dalit movement as late as 1937–38.
Since 1937 the situation began to change in different areas in
different ways, depending on the nature of the commitment that the
local Congress leaders had towards the Gandhian creed of eliminat-
ing untouchability. In the eight provinces where the Congress was in
power for nearly two years, they performed in such a way that not
just critics like Ambedkar were unimpressed, but even those dalit
leaders who once sympathized with the Congress were gradually
alienated. An ideal example is M. C. Rajah. A staunch Gandhi sup-
porter since 1932, he became a member of the executive council of
the Harijan Sevak Sangh. He won the election in 1937 from Madras,
where the local Congress, in recognition of his services, did not put
up any candidate against him.19 But in 1938 when he proposed to
move a Temple Entry Bill, the Congress premier, Rajagopalachari,
asked him to withdraw it. When he refused and moved his bill in due
course, the premier himself stood up to oppose it on the ground that
he would later propose another bill in the same line, but only for
Malabar and not for the other districts. The bill was then defeated,
with all Congress members, including the dalits, voting against it.20
When Rajah complained to Gandhi, the latter advised him to ‘trust
C. R. to do his best. . . . Go to him, reason with him and if you cannot
persuade him, bear with him. That is my advice’. But his advice
failed to convince a frustrated Rajah. About a month later he wrote
to Gandhi in despair: ‘I wish your followers in general and your chief
representative in this Presidency in particular felt one half of your
concern in the matter.’ Gandhi was surrounded by sycophants, he
lamented, who behaved well in his presence, but quickly forgot their
promises and obligations when away from him.21 In November, there-
fore, Rajah made a fervent ‘plea for a separate Harijan party’, free
from the influence of the caste Hindus who dominated the Con-
19 Rajah to Gandhi, 12 March 1937, M. C. Rajah Papers, NMML.
20 Rajah to Gandhi, 25 Aug. 1938, ‘Depressed Classes Betrayed By Gandhi and
Congress: M. C. Raja–M. K. Gandhi Correspondence’, M. C. Rajah Papers, NMML.
21 Rajah to Gandhi, 17 Oct. 1938, ibid.
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gress.22 In 1942 when Ambedkar started his All India Scheduled
Caste Federation, with its constitution claiming the Scheduled
Castes to be ‘distinct and separate from the Hindus’,23 Rajah was
only too happy to join this organization. In Bombay, Ambedkar too
was disappointed with the Congress government. But the situation
was different in non-Congress provinces. In a Muslim majority prov-
ince like Bengal, electoral arithmetic made the Congress leadership
realize the value of the Scheduled Caste reserved seats in the legis-
lature. The efforts of leaders like Subhash and Sarat Chandra Bose,
therefore, steadily brought the dalit leadership of the province to the
side of the Congress. So when Ambedkar’s Federation opened its
provincial branch in 1943, it attracted very little support from the
dalit leaders, as the majority of them had already joined the Con-
gress-supported Calcutta Scheduled Caste League.24 In other words,
organized dalit politics in all-India terms never represented a mono-
lithic structure. It always was a contested terrain, where the Federa-
tion and the Congress constantly jockeyed for exclusive space.
Towards Crisis
The fragmented nature of dalit organization gradually precipitated
the crisis of representation. The bitterly debated question was, which
of the two organizations—the All India Scheduled Castes Federation
of Ambedkar (hereafter Federation) or the All India Depressed
Classes League of Jagjivan Ram (hereafter League)—truly repres-
ented the dalits. The perceived legitimacy of this representation,
ironically, depended on the official recognition of the colonial state.
This question came to the forefront when the Cripps Mission visited
India in 1942 and proposed to meet representatives of different
political groups to negotiate for a future constitution of India. A
number of provincial dalit leaders, aligned with Ambedkar, prayed
for interviews with Sir Stafford Cripps and questioned the authority
of other political organizations to speak for them.25 But all these
22 ‘Plea for Separate Harijan Party’, Paper-clipping in M. C. Rajah Papers,
NMML.
23 Quoted in B. R. Ambedkar, Emancipation of the Untouchables (Reprint, Bombay,
1972), p. 16.
24 For details, see Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Protest and Identity in Colonial
India: The Namasudras of Bengal 1872–1947 (Richmond, Surrey, 1997), pp. 173–209.
25 Amulyadhan Ray, President All Bengal Scheduled Caste Federation, to the
Private Secretary to Viceroy, 18 March 1942, India Office Records [hereafter IOR]:
L/P&J/10/14; M. B. Mullick to Stafford Cripps, 24 March 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/14;
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requests were turned down, as Cripps had no time to meet provincial
delegations. He would, of course, see the ‘all India representatives
of the Depressed Classes’,26 and for this purpose an invitation was
extended to Dr Ambedkar and Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah.
This invitation put on Ambedkar’s Federation the seal of official
legitimacy, which was bitterly resented and vehemently resisted by
his opponents, the members and affiliates of the League. In a
strongly worded rejoinder, Jamuna Ram, one of the Secretaries of
the League, wrote to the Viceroy that ‘Dr. Ambedkar does not and
cannot represent the entire section of the Depressed Classes of the
country. The only body that has the privilege of calling itself the
representative of the said classes is the Depressed Classes League’.
In a subsequent note three days later, he urged Sir Stafford Cripps
to extend an invitation to Babu Jagjivan Ram in his capacity as the
president of the League.27 The demand was reiterated more bluntly
in another letter from Prithvi Singh Azad, the General Secretary of
the League:
Dr. Ambedkar and R. B. M. C. Rajah may represent their particular caste
but they have no locus standi to represent all the depressed classes of India.
If sir, you leave India without meeting the representatives of the All India
Depressed Classes League, people shall have reasons to suspect the bona-
fides of the British Government’s Mission in India.28
Yet, in spite of such strong protestation, Cripps in a curt reply
regretted his inability ‘to grant interviews to representatives of indi-
vidual organisations’.29 In other words, in spite of all pleadings he
refused to recognize the League as the ‘legitimate’ representative of
the dalits—a status that was conferred on the Federation, repres-
ented by Rajah and Ambedkar. This conferment did not of course
go uncontested. Apart from some provincial organizations,30 the
Working Committee of the League met on 2 April, with Jagjivan
Ram in the chair, and put on record their displeasure at the official
Hari Prasad Tamta, President, Kumaon Shilpkar Sabha and UP Adi Hindu
Depressed Class Association, to Sir Stafford Cripps, 27 March 1942, IOR: L/P&J/
10/14.
26 F. F. Turnbull to Ch. Moola Singh, 27 March 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/14.
27 Jamuna Ram to Viceroy, 22 March 1942; Jamuna Ram to the Private Secretary
to Sir Stafford Cripps, 25 March 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/14.
28 Prithvi Singh Azad to Sir Stafford Cripps, 28 March 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/14.
29 B. C. A. Cook, Private Secretary to Sir Stafford Cripps to Prithvi Singh Azad,
29 March 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/14. Italics added.
30 G. M. Thaware to Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 29 March 1942, IOR: L/
P&J/10/14; Telegram from O. M. Chidambaram to Viceroy, 8 April 1942, IOR: L/
P&J/10/14.
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position. After three days of deliberation it adopted a memorandum
which announced that the League was ‘the only representative body of
the Depressed Classes’, and by not consulting it, Sir Cripps had cast
all democratic principles to the winds, in pursuance of a policy of
divide and rule.
As the Depressed Classes are religiously and culturally have become one
with the Hindu Society, any effort to drive a wedge between the so-called
caste-Hindus and the Depressed Classes will prove injurious to both of them
. . . Therefore the League strongly condemns the move of those persons who
want to encourage separatist mentality among a section of the Depressed
Classes and declares that it will resist all such designs to disintegrate the
Hindu society.31
But this was once again a disputed claim. In Azad’s own province,
the Punjab Provincial Depressed Classes Association expressed its
confidence in the leadership of Ambedkar and Rajah, condemned
the ‘pro-Hindu’ leaders like Azad and claimed that the Scheduled
Castes were ‘racially and culturally different from all’.32 In a similar
way, the Working Committee of the Punjab Balmiki Depressed
Classes League in a meeting on 8 April condemned the action of
such ‘nominal and irresponsible leaders’ as Ram and Azad and
emphatically claimed that ‘the Depressed Classes are neither Hindus
nor they want to be Hindus’.33 Thus in 1942, there was no consensus
among the dalits. But in the official gaze of the colonial state, it
was the Congress-supported League which suffered from a crisis of
representation, and Ambedkar and his Federation were recognized
as the ‘legitimate’ representatives of the dalits. In about four years’
time this situation was to be exactly reversed, putting Ambedkar in
an identical crisis of legitimacy.
If Ambedkar received the expected recognition from Sir Stafford
Cripps, his Mission also precipitated the crisis for his politics and
this was the crisis of patronage. In an uneven playing field of Indian
politics, Ambedkar and other dalit organizations had all along looked
to the colonial state for adequate protection of their political and
civil rights. But when the two dalit leaders met Sir Stafford Cripps
on 30 March, they discovered that this patronage was gradually shift-
31 Memorandum of the All India Depressed Classes League, 4 April 1942, IOR:
L/P&J/10/14. Emphasis added.
32 President, Punjab Provincial Depressed Classes Association to Governor Gen-
eral, 6 April 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/14.
33 Punjab Balmiki Depressed Classes League to Sir Stafford Cripps, n.d., IOR: L/
P&J/10/14.
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ing and they were going to be placed ‘under an unmitigated system
of Hindu rule’.34 The Cripps proposals, Ambedkar thought, did not
provide for adequate protection of the political rights of the Sched-
uled Castes. He immediately denounced the proposals as ‘a betrayal
of past undertakings . . . and as a defeatist surrender to the Congress
and Muslim League’.35 A Special Scheduled Castes Political Confer-
ence held at Allahabad on 10 December 1942, resolved that ‘India
. . . [was] not a nation but . . . a constellation of nations . . .’. Within
this federation, the Scheduled Castes were recognized as ‘a separate
political group’ in the Round Table Conference, in the Communal
Award and in the Viceroy’s August declaration. But the Cripps pro-
posals had completely ignored their interests and had paved the way
for the ‘framing of the future constitution of Caste-Hindus’.36
In a subsequent Memorandum to Linlithgow, Ambedkar further
clarified his objections to Cripps’ proposals. They provided two ways
of protecting the interests of the minorities, he pointed out, ‘(1)
through Constituent Assembly and (2) through the provision of a
Treaty’. The Treaty provision,37 borrowed from the Irish model, was
incompatible with the idea of dominion status, he argued. And the
Constituent Assembly plan would ‘be fatal to the Depressed Classes’,
because the Hindus would be a majority there and would refuse to
recognize the dalits as a minority. In a joint electorate, it would not
be difficult for the Hindus to have their own nominees elected in all
the 151 seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes in the provincial
assemblies, and thereby control the 15 seats in the Constituent
Assembly which were due to such classes. This was a distinct possibil-
ity, because although the dalits did not participate in ‘the present
subversive movement started by the Congress’, the latter were trying
to enlist them ‘to show to the outside world that the Depressed
Classes . . . [were] with the Congress’. Ever since the Congress made
this proposal of a Constituent Assembly, he pointed out, the govern-
34 B. R. Ambedkar and M. C. Rajah to Sir Stafford Cripps, 1 April 1942, in
Nicholas Mansergh, (ed.), The Transfer of Power 1942–7 (London, 1970), Vol. I, p.
603.
35 Summary of statement by Dr Ambedkar, 4 April 1942, IOR: L/P&J/10/13.
36 President, Adi Hindu Depressed Classes Association to Private Secretary to
the Secretary of State for India, n.d., IOR: L/P&J/8/685.
37 The Cripps proposals had provided for the signing of a treaty between His
Majesty’s Government and the Indian Constitution-making body. It would ‘make
provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty’s government, for
the protection of racial and religious minorities’. See Draft Declaration for Discus-
sion with Indian Leaders (as published) in The Transfer of Power, Vol. I, p. 565.
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ment had been consistently rejecting it. But now, ‘for reasons best
known to them His Majesty’s Government thought it necessary to
win over the Congress by surrendering to its demands without caring
to know what would be the fate of the minorities’. And he was par-
ticularly apprehensive, because although the Cripps Mission had
failed, no one could say ‘with confidence of certainty that the Cripps
proposals . . . [were] dead and gone’.38
The sub-text that comes out clearly from the above Memorandum
is an anxiety at the prospect of colonial patronage gradually shifting
towards the Congress, which might some day establish itself as the
legitimate representative of the dalits in India. And this was not any
more a very distant possibility, as it was clearly indicated by a private
correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy
around this time.
The fundamental weakness of the Scheduled Castes is that they are neither
one thing nor the other. If they had the courage to turn Christian or
Moslem en bloc it would be much easier to legislate for them. But so long
as they remain a part of the Hindu system, with no separate religion or
basis of organisation as such, and continue to regard themselves as Hindus,
it does look as if their only chance of betterment lay, not on the political
side, but on gradually winning their way socially in the Hindu community.39
The passage makes it clear that the colonial bureaucracy at this
stage was defining political identities in India on the basis of religion
alone, and endorsing, to a large extent, the Gandhian position that
the salvation of the dalits lay in their religious integration into the
Hindu society. Such official definition was about to marginalize all
other minority identities in India that were not defined by religion.
Ambedkar’s struggle, therefore, was to reverse this political tide
released by the transfer of power process and affirmed by the other
dominant political groups in the country. Alternately, he could reiter-
ate more forcefully that the dalits were not Hindus, but a religious
minority, in line with the official definition.
The situation in 1942–43 was not yet bad enough for Ambedkar.
Linlithgow was still ‘convinced’ that he was ‘the right and only proper
representative of the Depressed Classes’,40 and therefore, shortly
after the departure of Cripps, in July 1942 he was invited to join
the Viceroy’s Executive Council as a Labour Member. In October,
38 Ambedkar to Linlithgow, 8 Jan. 1943, IOR: L/P&J/8/685.
39 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 8 Feb. 1943, IOR: L/P&J/8/685.
40 Telegram from Linlithgow to Amery, 20 Feb. 1942, The Transfer of Power, Vol.
I, p. 211.
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in response to a request from the Viceroy, he submitted a lengthy
Memorandum, ‘containing the grievances of the Scheduled Castes
and the remedies for removing them’. In it he humbly reminded the
Viceroy that: ‘Government has a duty towards the Scheduled Castes
. . .’.41 At least the Secretary of State, it seemed, had not forgotten
this duty. The Scheduled Castes, he argued, constituted ‘between a
sixth and a seventh of the whole population of India’. And also there
were ‘politically very considerable advantages in having two substan-
tial minorities’. The government could thus avoid being labelled as
either ‘pro-Muslum’ or ‘anti-Hindu’.42 In the next year, therefore,
substantial concessions were offered to the Scheduled Castes. These
included an additional seat in the Central Assembly, reservation in
the Indian Civil Service, reservation of 8.5 per cent in recruitment
to the Central Services, reservation for technical training in certain
government institutions and an allocation of Rs 3 lakhs for scholar-
ships for technical training in India and abroad.43
But these were certainly not enough. It had become clear by now
that the British were going to withdraw from India, and in such a
contingency, the dalits had to find a niche within the new political
structure of free India. In reply to a reception in Calcutta on 26
August 1944, a panicky Ambedkar therefore reacted by saying that
‘there should be no transfer of power . . . unless and until the
Depressed Classes . . . [were] elevated in education, economic condi-
tions and social position to the level of the other more fortunate
sections of His Majesty’s subjects’.44 He knew clearly that it was not
going to happen; but he had to ensure that the interests of the dalits
were protected in the new constitution of independent India. So far
as the colonial government was concerned, things were still going
well for Ambedkar. In a telegram to the Viceroy on 5 August, the
Secretary of State had made it clear that the offer of unqualified
freedom after the war would be conditional on the framing of a con-
stitution, agreed to by all the ‘main elements of India’s national
life’, including the ‘Depressed Classes’.45 Wavell communicated this
message to Gandhi on 15 August.46 But neither Gandhi nor Jinnah
41 Ambedkar to Linlithgow, 29 Oct. 1942, IOR: L/P&J/8/685.
42 Amery to Linlithgow, 16 Dec. 1942, IOR: L/P&J/8/685.
43 The Statesman, 30 Nov. 1943.
44 The Hindu, 26 Sept. 1944, Paper-cutting in Ambedkar Papers, File No. 103,
NMML.
45 Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 4 Aug. 1944, Wavell Collection,
Vol. 3, p. 32, Mss.Eur.D.977, India Office Library [hereafter IOL].
46 Wavell to Gandhi, 15 Aug. 1944, Wavell Collection, Vol. 3, p. 41.
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and the Muslim League, as it appeared, were prepared to involve
the dalits in any serious negotiations. In response to a letter from
Ambedkar, Gandhi curtly reminded him that he considered untouch-
ability to be a question of religious and social reform, and therefore
did not require a political solution. And because of this difference
of opinion, he would prefer to move alone, without Ambedkar.47 It
was this intransigence which was for Ambedkar the real reason for
concern.
Therefore, when the Gandhi–Jinnah talks commenced in Bombay,
Ambedkar in a press statement in September 1944 reminded them
of ‘making a serious mistake’. For, ‘[b]esides the Hindus and the
Muslims, the Scheduled Castes are a third necessary party. . . .
[They] could not be included in Pakistan without their express con-
sent . . .’48 A few days later at another meeting in Hyberabad, he
declared emphatically that: ‘If Hindustan belonged to any one, it
was to the three parties, namely, Hindus, Muslims and Scheduled
Castes.’49 Because, as he argued, the latter were ‘no‘ part of the
Hindu community, but constituted a different nation’. He also
refuted the allegation that the dalits were not interested in freedom
and asserted that ‘they wanted the independence of their community
along with the independence of the country’.50 In other words, his
primary project now was to get the Scheduled Castes recognized as
‘a third necessary party’ for any serious negotiations for the transfer of
power.
This point came up in a major way in the meeting of the Working
Committee of the All India Scheduled Caste Federation, held in
Madras on 23 September 1944. It was presided over by N. Sivaraj
and participated by Ambedkar. One of the resolutions adopted in
this meeting reiterated that the Scheduled Castes were ‘a religious
minority in real sense and within the meaning of the Cripps Pro-
posals’51 or in other words, exactly in accordance with the official
definition of a minority. And therefore, no constitution of free India
would be acceptable to them, unless it recognized them as ‘a distinct
47 The correspondence was reported in Anandabazar Patrika, 7 Jan. 1945.
48 Times of India, 5 Sept. 1944, Paper-clipping, Ambedkar Papers, File No. 1–3,
NMML.
49 The Hyderabad Bulletin, 20 Sept. 1944, in ibid.
50 Leader, 22 Sept. 1944, Paper-cutting in GI, Reforms Office, File No. 21/6/44-R,
NAI.
51 The Mail, 24 Sept. 1944, Paper-clipping, Ambedkar Papers, File No. 1–3,
NMML. Italics added.
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and separate element in the national life of India’ and provided for
them a system of separate electorate and reservation in public ser-
vices. But more interesting was the resolution on the ‘separate settle-
ment’ for the Scheduled Castes. It proposed that the constitution
should provide for the transportation of such castes from their pre-
sent habitats to form separate Scheduled Caste villages away from
the Hindu villages. A Settlement Commission was to be constituted
for this purpose, with adequate funds to buy private lands to set up
such separate settlements for the dalits.52 Such an arrangement was
necessary, the resolution argued, for the ‘better protection’ of the
dalits from the ‘tyranny and oppression of the caste Hindus’, which
might ‘take a worse form under Swaraj . . .’.53
The Working Committee of the Scheduled Caste Federation at
this stage, it appears, wished to push the idea of separate identity
to its most extreme limit, in the same way as the Muslim League
was pushing its Pakistan demand. Extremist rhetorics were flowing
ebulliently from Ambedkar himself, causing embarrassment to the
Viceroy, as at this stage he was also a member of the Executive
Council.54 At a large gathering, for example, at Ellore on 30 Sep-
tember, he thundered: ‘If the British have a hundred reasons to fight
the Germans, you untouchables have a thousand and more causes
to fight the Hindus. You must be prepared to state that if argument
fails, force will be used to obtain your rights.’55 But such rhetoric
notwithstanding, the main ambition of the dalit leadership, as
Ambedkar himself made it clear in another public meeting in
Madras, was to ensure that the new constitution of free India was
‘a tripartite one in which the Hindus, Muslims and the Scheduled
Castes . . . [had] equal place and equal authority’.56
A clearer blueprint of this preferred constitution for free India
was offered at another meeting of the All Scheduled Caste Federa-
tion, held in Bombay on 6 May 1945. The new constitution, Ambed-
kar announced in his Presidential Address, should be ‘framed by Indi-
ans for Indians and with the voluntary consent of Indians’. A
52 The Hindu, 24 Sept. 1944, Paper-cutting in GI, Reforms Office, File No. 21/6/
44-R, NAI.
53 The Mail, 24 Sept. 1944, Paper-clipping, Ambedkar Papers, File No. 1–3,
NMML.
54 Wavell to Amery, 8 Nov. 1944, IOR: L/P&J/8/683.
55 Dawn, 3 Oct. 1944, Paper-cutting in GI, Reforms Office, File No. 21/9/44-R,
NAI.
56 The Mail, 26 Sept. 1944, Paper-clipping, Ambedkar Papers, File No. 1–3,
NMML.
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constitution ‘imposed by one powerful section or a combination of
such sections on other sections’ would not do. Such a constitution
should also seek to eliminate ‘majority rule’, which was ‘untenable
in theory and unjustifiable in practice’. Because, in India the majority
was ‘not a political majority’, but a ‘communal majority’, which was
born, not made, and therefore could not be ‘unmade and remade’.
It was ‘a permanent majority fixed in its attitude’, which could be
destroyed but not transformed. The rule by such a majority could
therefore never be sacrosanct and to avoid it there should be reserva-
tion of seats for the caste Hindus, Muslims and the Scheduled Castes
in equal proportions in both central and provincial Assemblies. Even
the Executive would not be formed by the majority party in the legis-
lature; it should have the ‘mandate not only from the majority but
also from the minorities in the Legislature’. This arrangement, he
hoped, would solve the communal problem in India and even would
satisfy the Muslims, as it would eliminate the danger of domination
by a communal majority. ‘My proposals’, he claimed, ‘are for an
United India’. And its underlying principle was ‘a rule of unanimity’.
‘It is obvious’, he argued, ‘that if the principle of unanimity was
accepted by the Hindus as a rule of decision in the Legislature and
in the Executive there would be no such thing as a Communal Prob-
lem in India’. And if this was not done, freedom would be vulnerable
and meaningless, Ambedkar warned:
Without making any such sacrifice the Hindu majority is not justified in
representing to the outside world that the minorities are holding up India’s
Freedom. The false propaganda will not pay. For the minorities are doing
nothing of the kind. They are prepared to accept freedom and the dangers
in which they likely [sic] to be involved; provided they granted [sic] satisfact-
ory safeguards.57
The official British policy of recognizing the Scheduled Castes as
a substantial minority had not been completely reversed yet and
Ambedkar was still being acknowledged as their legitimate repres-
entative. In a routine appraisal of the political situation in India in
April 1944, Wavell found Ambedkar to be having ‘a certain following
amongst the Depressed Classes but it . . . [was] not influential’.58
Yet, a few months later, in October when he started contemplating
a ‘transitional government’, representing all political parties, he
57 Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar
Writings and Speeches (Bombay, 1979), Vol. I, pp.360, 368–9, 373, 376–8.
58 ‘Appreciation of the Indian Political Situation by His Excellency the Viceroy’,
April 1944, Wavell Collection, Vol. 3, p. 11.
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could only think of Ambedkar as the representative of the Depressed
Classes.59 Even in November 1944 when the Non-Party Conference
appointed a committee under Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to discuss the
basis of a future constitution of India, the latter turned to Ambedkar
to recommend the names of dalit representatives on the sub-
committee for the Scheduled Castes. Ambedkar initially favoured
the proposal, but later declined to co-operate, as he found some other
members of the committee to be already prejudiced against the
minorities.60 The Sapru Conciliation Committee, however, was
doomed to failure, as Jinnah too, like Ambedkar, refused to co-
operate.61 But the fact that comes out clearly from the developments
of this period is that until now, despite Gandhi’s reservations, the
dalits were still being officially considered as an important and dis-
crete element in Indian public life, and Ambedkar was universally
regarded as their accredited leader. However, it was also the time
when things had begun to change and the latter’s vision of a ‘rule
of unanimity’ was fast becoming an unrealistic dream.
When Wavell on 14 June 1945 announced his plan to convene a
conference with a view to forming a new ‘entirely Indian’ Executive
Council (except for the presence of the Viceroy and the
Commander-in-chief), representing all the ‘main communities’ of
India, he did not forget to include the Scheduled Castes.62 The Hindu
Mahasabha at once protested against the move to separate the
Scheduled Castes from the caste Hindus, which they thought was
calculated to ‘bring about disintegration of the Hindus’.63 The Con-
gress newspapers also resented this and protested against its implica-
tion that Congress represented only the caste Hindus.64 Gandhi too
complained against the caste Hindus being distinguished from others
and argued that Congress was a national and not a communal
party.65 But Wavell did not share this view and asked Ambedkar to
59 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 Oct. 1944, Wavell Collection, Vol. 3, p. 78.
60 Anandabazar Patrika, 2, 3, 21 Jan. 1945.
61 Fortnightly Report on the Press for the second half of January 1945, Govern-
ment of Bengal [hereafter GB], Home (Political) Confidential File No. 37/45, West
Bengal State Archives.
62 Broadcast speech by His Excellency the Viceroy at New Delhi on the 14th June
1945, IOR: R/3/1/95.
63 Telegram from L. B. Bhopatkar, General Secretary. All India Hindu Mahas-
abha to Secretary of State for India, 14 June 1945, IOR: L/P&J/8/683.
64 Press Adviser’s appreciation for the second half of June 1945, IOR: L/P&J/5/
152.
65 Wavell to Amery, Secret Report on Simla Conference, 15 July 1945, IOR: R/
3/1/95.
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represent the Scheduled Castes in the Simla conference. The latter,
however, declined the offer and recommended instead the name of
N. Sivaraj, the President of the Federation, as a ‘substitute’. His
main reason for refusing to attend the conference was the ‘extreme
inadequacy’ of representation given to the Scheduled Castes in the
proposed Executive Council.
Five seats to 90 millions of Muslims, one seat to 50 millions of Untouch-
ables and 1 seat to 6 million of Sikhs is a strange and sinister kind of
political arithmetic which is revolting to my ideas of justice and common
sense. I cannot be a party to it. . . .
. . . What shocks me that His Majesty’s Government with all their profes-
sion of being trustees for the Scheduled Castes and contrary to their
repeated declarations should have treated their wards in such an ill-liberal,
unfair and unjust manner. . . .66
Ambedkar asked for at least two dalit representatives in the Coun-
cil, although Wavell was not so sure about it. Inclusion of two Sched-
uled Caste members in a Council of fourteen Indians, he thought,
would not be ‘justified’, particularly as this might lead to similar
demands from Sikhs and Indian Christians, and might incur the dis-
approval of Gandhi.67 But the Secretary of State, on the other hand,
was more sympathetic, as he was constantly receiving telegrams from
dalit organizations, demanding three seats. And to forestall Gandhi’s
objection, he suggested party, rather than community basis, for
selecting members, ‘for Gandhi surely . . . [could not] deny the exist-
ence of Ambedkar’s party organisation’.68 Two things come out
clearly from this pre-Simla correspondence. First, there was a grow-
ing concern in Ambedkar that colonial patronage was shifting. And
second, although the colonial state still recognized the legitimacy of
his leadership and his organization, there were also doubts popping
up in the minds of some of the officials.
At the Simla conference, it was the community–party equation
which became the most disputed issue. While Jinnah demanded
parity with the Congress and refused to accept Congress nominating
any Muslim member for the proposed Executive Council, the Con-
gress representatives could not accept the contention that their party
represented only the caste Hindus. Sivaraj, on the other hand,
66 Ambedkar to Wavell, 7 June 1945, Wavell Collection, Vol. 4, pp. 207–8.
67 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8 June 1945, Wavell Collection,
Vol. 4, p. 221.
68 Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22 June 1945, Wavell Collection,
Vol. 4, p. 262.
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objected to Muslim demand for parity, because he thought that the
Muslims too were one of the minorities and granting them a privil-
eged position would reduce the shares of the other minorities.69
Ambedkar too in a note to the Viceroy protested against the pro-
posed parity.70 But what is more interesting, while Congress insisted
on including in its list members of other communities, particularly
the Scheduled Castes, Sivaraj objected to such claims, as the Sched-
uled Castes, he contended, constituted a separate community and
could only be represented by the Scheduled Caste Federation.71 The
Viceroy, however, thought that Congress could ‘reasonably ask to
have one non-Hindu seat’, notably one Scheduled Caste man.72
After consulting his Working Committee, Sivaraj on 2 July sent
to the Viceroy a panel of four nominees of the Federation, and they
were Ambedkar, Sivaraj himself, Jogendranath Mandal from Bengal
and Ram Prasad Tamta from UP.73 According to the Viceroy, the
list included ‘Ambedkar, Sivaraj and two non-entities’.74 The Con-
gress list of fourteen, on the other hand, included two Scheduled
Castes: Muniswami Pillai from Madras and Radhanath Das from
Bengal.75 While constituting his Council, the Viceroy was now faced
with what his private secretary Evan Jenkins described as the ‘incom-
patible claims’ of the Congress, the Muslim League and the Sched-
uled Castes. The Congress could legitimately claim one of their
Scheduled Caste nominees to be included, while the Viceroy thought
that Ambedkar was ‘the only Scheduled Caste man of outstanding
ability’.76 So the compromise was to have Ambedkar, although Con-
gress might object to him, and Muniswami Pillai, from the Congress
list, as he was found to be an ‘amiable non-entity’. Provisionally,
Ambedkar was allocated the Labour portfolio and Pillai Education.77
But the new Executive Council never became operative, as Jinnah
on 10 July finally communicated his refusal to co-operate, unless all
69 Minutes of the Conference of Political Leaders held in Viceregal Lodge, Simla,
on Monday the 25th June 1945, Political Volume Part II, Simla Conference June–
July 1945, Wavell Collection, Vol. 5, p. 127.
70 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 June 1945, Wavell Collection,
Vol. 4, p. 219.
71 Simla Conference, Confidential Note No. 5 for 29th June 1945, IOR: R/3/1/
95.
72 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/95.
73 N. Sivaraj to Wavell, 2 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/101.
74 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/95.
75 Maulana Azad to Wavell, 7 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/96.
76 Notes by E. M. Jenkins, dated 7 July, 9 July and 11 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/95.
77 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/96.
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the Muslim members were taken from the League—a demand which
the Viceroy declined to accept.78 So far as dalit politics were con-
cerned, as the Federation resisted and then reluctantly accepted the
parallel Congress claim to represent the Scheduled Castes, the Simla
conference foreshadowed its future crisis, ie., the Congress gradually
nudging it out completely from its own constituency.
The Crisis
The crisis of representation for dalit politics manifested itself in the
elections of 1945–46, in which the Congress almost completely
ousted the Federation from the Scheduled Castes reserved seats all
over India. In Bombay, where in 1937 the non-Congress dalits had
won 12 General seats, this time the Federation contested in 19 Gen-
eral seats, including 15 reserved seats, and was defeated in almost
all by Congress candidates. So far as the reserved seats were con-
cerned, 14 went to Congress candidates and the remaining one to
an Independent candidate. Congress won all the reserved seats in
Madras (30), United Provinces (20), Bihar (15), Assam (7) and
Orissa (7). Among the other provinces, in Bengal Congress won in
24 out of 30 reserved seats, the independent candidates winning in
4, the Communist Party in 1 and the Federation in 1 only. In Punjab,
the Congress won in 6 and the Unionists in 2 of the 8 reserved seats.
In the Central Provinces and Berar, another previous stronghold of
the Federation, Congress won in 19 of the 20 reserved seats, the
Federation candidate taking the other one.79 So, out of 151 reserved
seats all over India, the Federation candidates won in only 2 seats—
one in Bengal and one in C.P. But what was more startling, even in
the Primary Elections, the Federation had contested only in 22 seats
and only in Bombay and C.P., votes polled in favour of the Federation
were more than those cast in favour of the Congress. In Madras, the
situation was more or less evenly balanced, while in the rest of the
country, the votes cast in favour of Congress and ‘others’ were much
more than those in favour of the Federation. The colonial govern-
78 Telegram from Viceroy to all Governors, 11 July 1945, IOR: R/3/1/95.
79 ‘Statement showing the results of the elections to the Indian Legislative
Assembly, and to the Legislative Assemblies in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, The
United Provinces, Punjab, Bihar, Assam, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, Central
Provinces and Berar and Orissa’, IOR: L/P&J/8/483; also see, GI, Home (Political)
File No. 79/46–Poll(I), Vol. III, NAI.
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ment could draw only one predictable conclusion from this electoral
disaster:
. . . [T]he Federation has only local influence in a few areas in Bombay and
the C.P. . . . The fact that they have not forced the issue in as much as 129
out of the 151 constituencies—and have not even put up candidates in
quite a good number of constituencies—must be taken to be an indication
that they had no reasonable chance of success even in the primary
elections.80
The question now is, how to explain this disaster. The Working
Committee of the Federation had perhaps anticipated it, as in a
resolution adopted at a meeting in Poona on 2–3 October 1945, it
had expressed its concern. The high property qualifications, it
argued, had excluded the majority of the dalits from franchise, and
therefore in a general electorate they had hardly any chance of get-
ting their own representatives elected to the provincial legislatures.
And therefore, the resolution claimed, a Constituent Assembly,
drawn from such unrepresentative provincial legislatures would have
no ‘moral authority to frame a constitution’.81 But even though we
recognize the undeniable truth in this contention, we cannot explain
the spectacular disaster only in terms of joint electorate. It cannot
explain why the overwhelming majority of votes even in the primary
elections, where only the dalits voted, went to candidates other than
those of the Federation. And more particularly, it cannot explain
why the Federation could not even field candidates in as many as
129 out of 151 reserved seats. What this situation perhaps clearly
indicates is a near total lack of organization.
The Working Committee of the Federation, in view of the crucial
importance of this election, had issued an appeal to all dalits in the
country to join the Federation and to make it ‘the sole representative
body of the Scheduled Castes’. It had also warned that helping those
who had joined other political organizations for personal advantages
would be considered as acts of ‘treason against the community’.82
But clearly the Federation had no organizational machinery to
mobilize such mass support at a national level or prevent large-scale
defections that were eroding its support base. After the 1952 elec-
80 Memorandum on the elections to the seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes
in the Provincial Assemblies, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
81 Resolutions passed by the Working Committee of the All India Scheduled
Castes Federation at its meeting held in Poona on the 2/3rd of October 1945, IOR:
L/P&J/8/685.
82 Ibid.
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tion fiasco, Kamalakant Chitre in a letter to Ambedkar mentioned
the lack of organization as the ‘foremost’ cause of the defeat. ‘Our
own organisation was a tattered one’. He wrote. ‘Practically there is
nothing except your name, but for which we would have been
nowhere’.83 If this was the situation in January 1952, one could ima-
gine the scenario in 1946, when even Ambedkar himself had no time,
particularly since his appointment as the Labour Member of the
Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1942, to give his personal attention
to such organizational matters. As a result, as the Dawn reported, ‘his
community . . . [was] unable to derive the full benefit of his dynamic
leadership’.84 The Federation also miserably lacked funds to conduct
a viable election campaign. When Ambedkar launched his election
campaign at Nare Park in Bombay on 3 March 1946, entry to his
meeting was by ticket. Although 70,000 people gathered, and the
gate money collected was Rs 17,000, such an admission fee could
definitely act as a disincentive to attend meetings for a population
that usually had little money to spare. As the President of the
Bombay branch of the Federation announced, the target was to raise
in this way a campaign fund of Rs 50,000; but it would hardly match
the Congress funds, which were being lavishly supported by the
capitalists.85
But the greatest hurdle for the Federation was the popular appeal
of nationalism and the euphoria of patriotism created by the recent
Quit India movement, which had set the tone for the election cam-
paign of 1945–46. Even though outwardly a failure, the Congress
had emerged from this movement with a certain aura and a
nationwide political legitimacy which no other party at that time
could match. It was precisely for that reason that the Justice Party
in Madras did not field any candidate against the Congress in this
election. As Sir P. T. Rajan stated later before the Cabinet Mission,
owing to their support for the British government in the past, they
were ‘dubbed as traitors by the electorate’.86 Ambedkar’s joining the
Viceroy’s Executive Council at a time when Quit India movement
83 Unsigned letter, [most probably written by Kamalakant Chitre to B. R.
Ambedkar], 14 Jan. 1952, Dr B. R. Ambedkar Papers, NAI.
84 Dawn, 20 March 1946, Paper-clipping in Ambedkar Papers, File Nos. 1–3,
NMML.
85 Jay Bheem, 5 March 1946, Paper clipping in Ambedkar Papers, File Nos. 1–3,
NMML.
86 Note of Meeting between Sir S. Cripps, Mr. Alexander and Sir P. T. Rajan on
Wednesday 17 April 1946, The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p. 290.
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was being launched was itself a controversial matter. Over and above
that, he was preaching an altogether different version of nationalism
which was severely critical of the Congress variety. The ‘freedom of
the nation’, he believed, ‘if it . . . [was] to be a reality must vouchsafe
the freedom of the different classes comprised in it, particularly . . .
the servile classes’.87 But the ‘freedom which the governing class in
India . . . [was] struggling for’, he pointed out, was ‘freedom to rule
the servile classes’.88 And the Congress, in his opinion, represented
only the governing classes, preached only that variety of nationalism
which protected the interests of those classes and ‘prohibit[ed] any
other ideology inconsistent with nationalism being preached from its
platform’.89 As the election approached, Ambedkar tried to clarify
his position before the general electorate. At a meeting in Agra on
10 March 1946 he declared: ‘The Scheduled Castes stand for the
freedom of India and not for the Congress-High class Hindu rule.’
It was only Congress which was their ‘greatest enemy’. Because they
treated the dalits ‘worse than dogs’. In other words, they were
fighting against the Congress, not against freedom. ‘We shall fight
for our rights’, he thundered, ‘and we will give our life for it, and
God willing we will have it’.90
But this definition of nationalism, constructed exclusively from the
dalit point of view, could hardly hope to dislodge the dominant
definition created by the unusual circumstances of the Quit India
movement. The political agenda of this nationalism was to drive the
British out, not to bother so much about citizen’s rights in a future
Indian nation state. Any one going against this nationalism was
bound to be labelled as unpatriotic. Congress leaders like Nehru
could only see in their critics, ‘their anti-nationalism, their subservi-
ence, their capacity to crush and humiliate their own countrymen’.91
Ambedkar himself later acknowledged that all other non-Congress
parties, particularly the Scheduled Castes Federation, suffered in the
election ‘because they were pro-British and had co-operated in the
war efforts’. The main ‘issue over which the election was fought was
Independence and Quit India’, and not the future constitution of
87 Dr. Banasaheb Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, Vol. IX, p. 202.
88 Ibid., p. 231.
89 Ibid., pp. 233–4.
90 News From India: Political Situation, Section No. 15, Serial No. 81, 18 March
1946, GI, Home (Political), File No. 51/2/1946(9), NAI.
91 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta, 1946), pp. 599–601, quoted
in Shourie, Worshipping False Gods, p. 116.
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India.92 And as a result, not only the Scheduled Caste Federation,
but all other minor political parties, including the Hindu Mahasabha,
were marginalized by the Congress in the election of 1945–46. What
F. G. Burrows, the Governor of Bengal, wrote to Wavell on 11 April
1946, was true for the whole of India and not for Bengal alone, and
therefore needs to be quoted here to bring out the real significance
of this election:
In the non-Mohammedan and Special Constituencies, the election has seen
the virtual elimination by the Congress of the smaller parties,—the non-
Congress Scheduled Castes and the Hindu Nationalist Party, which
included the Mahasabha,—and the substantial defeat of Communist hope.93
So Ambedkar’s defeat was nothing unusual and not unexpected.
His greatest problem now was to prove that his Federation, in spite
of this electoral set back, was the only organization that could claim
to represent the dalits. It was indeed a difficult task. By 1945–46
the Congress and later the Communists had substantially eroded
his support base by specifically targeting this population for political
mobilization. If we take Bombay as an example, as it was Ambedkar’s
main stronghold, the local Congress Harijan Committee here had
launched from January 1945 a campaign for ‘fraternising with the
Harijans in this City’. A detailed programme was chalked out for a
week which was to be observed everyday and would involve ‘as many
Congress workers as possible’. The programme included cleaning the
Harijan localities, giving baths to Harijan boys and girls, organizing
separate social gatherings for men and women, to be addressed by
prominent Congress leaders, etc.94 Then in February a more long-
term programme was launched and it included a training camp for
Harijans, night classes for such adults, outings for grown-up school-
going Harijan children, provision for libraries and reading rooms for
them and observance of special functions on important days and
Congress celebrations in Harijan neighbourhoods.95 Then on 22 Feb-
ruary 1945, the first anniversary day of the death of Kasturbai
Gandhi, two temples in Bombay were ceremonially opened to Hari-
92 B. R. Ambedkar, ‘The Cabinet Mission and the Untouchables’, Ambedkar
Papers, File No. 9, Part 1–2, Roll No. 3, NMML.
93 F. G. Burrows, Governor of Bengal, to Wavell, 18 July 1946, IOR: L/P&J/5/
153.
94 Appeal from the Secretary, Congress Harijan Committee, Bombay, 10 Jan.
1945, Bombay PCC Papers, File No. 84, NMML.
95 M. D. Dandekar, Secretary, Service to Harijan Committee, to S. K. Patil, Gen-
eral Secretary BPCC, 2 Feb. 1945, Bombay PCC Papers, File No. 84, NMML.
D A L I T P O L I T I C S I N I N D I A , 1 9 4 5 – 4 7 917
jans, in the presence of the local Congress president S. K. Patil and
the Sankaracharya, who blessed the Harijans on the occasion.96 And
so far as political representation was concerned, the Bombay Provin-
cial Congress Committee resolved in a meeting on 16 January 1946
that ‘[t]he representation of minorities and harijans shall not only
be maintained but efforts made to increase it as far as possible’.97
Finally, the Congress Election Manifesto of 1945–46 not only prom-
ised a constitution which would make all citizens ‘equal before the
law, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sex’, but promised to
carry through Gandhi’s constructive programme and ensure that the
‘distinction between the caste Hindus and Harijans . . . [was] abol-
ished’.98 One might argue that Congress was motivated by electoral
arithmetic, rather than genuine altruism, and these were just cos-
metic measures, which did not mean any real change in the life of
the dalits. But what mattered was the high visibility of such pro-
grammes in an election year and possibly that created in its favour
a desired swing in the voter’s sympathy. Apart from that, the Con-
gress high command also took special interest in the Scheduled
Caste constituency, as Patel sent specific instructions to the Vid-
arbha Provincial Congress Committee to take care of the Mahar
community, so that ‘no one of the followers of Dr. Ambedkar’ could
succeed.99
In various other parts of India outside Bombay and the Central
Provinces, which were the strongholds of Ambedkarite politics, the
Congress party and the Gandhian programme of Harijan upliftment
were gradually winning the loyalty of the local dalits. Mysore, for
example, had become ‘a model of ‘‘Ram-Raj’’ ’, while in general in all
the Kanada-speaking districts, the Harijan movement was gradually
becoming more and more popular since the early 1930s. In the
Teluga-speaking coastal Andhra and Hyderabad, the ‘Adi-Andhra’
movement disappeared by the early 1940s, and dalit politics was
divided into three streams: the Congress Party at the one end and
the pro-Muslim (or pro-Nizam) politics of patronage at the other,
96 Invitation letter from M. D. Dandekar, Secretary, Services to Harijans Com-
mittee of the Congress, 21 Feb. 1945, Bombay PCC Papers, File No. 84, NMML.
97 Minutes of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee urgent meeting held
on 16 Jan. 1946, Bombay PCC Papers, Subject Files No. 35, NMML.
98 Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, Reference Series—6, ‘The
Indian National Congress’, GI, Home (Political), File No. 79/46, Vol. I, NAI.
99 Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Durga Das (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 344–5, cited in Shou-
rie, Worshipping False Gods, p. 50.
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with the Communist movement gradually gaining ground preparing
the base for the Telengana uprising. Ultimately, however, by the
time of independence, ‘the establishment of Congress hagemony
became nearly complete’ in this region. Far away from Andhra, in
eastern India too, Jagjivan Ram through his Bihar Khet Mazdoor
Sabha was assiduously trying to win over the allegiance of the local
dalits, away from the Scheduled Caste Federation and the Commun-
ist-led Kisan Sabhas.100 In Bengal, Subhas Bose and later his brother
Sarat Bose had already bridged the gulf between the Congress and
the more popular dalit leadership in the province, through a new
outfit called the Calcutta Scheduled Caste League. Jogendranath
Mandal in 1945–46 was a lonely man in Bengal still bearing the flag
of the Ambedkarite Federation. On the other hand, in north Bengal,
the Communist-led Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha was gradually
consolidating its base among the dalit peasantry, preparing the way
for the coming of the Tebhaga movement.101
Thus, with the transfer of power clearly visible on the horizon, the
dalit leaders in the provinces were now seeking new alliances and
preferring merger with the Congress mainstream as the safest way
to protect their interests. The masses, on the other hand, were some-
times swayed by the reformist Harijan movement, sometimes
responded energetically to revoluntionary communist slogans. In
other words, dalit politics at the grassroots level had dramatically
changed in the last few years and these changes were amply reflected
in the election results, with the Congress winning a landslide victory
in the Scheduled Castes reserved seats. In a north Bengal constitu-
ency, a reserved seat went to a Communist dalit leader, indicating
a different trend in political mobilization. And then, this near total
rout of the Federation in the provincial elections was reflected in
the composition of the Constituent Assembly, as it was elected by
the members of the provincial legislatures. Among the 296 members
of the Constituent Assembly, 31 belonged to the Scheduled Castes,
of whom 29 were Congress nominees. One of them represented the
Unionist Party and the only representative of the Federation was
Ambedkar himself, elected from Bengal, with the help of Jogendra-
nath Mandal, the president of the Bengal branch of the Federation,
100 For details see Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution, pp. 260–321.
101 For details see Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Protest and Identity in Colonial India, pp.
173–237.
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one or two independent Scheduled Caste MLAs and ‘one or perhaps
two Anglo-Indian votes in addition’.102
This crisis of representation also led to the crisis of patronage,
and Ambedkar could easily foresee that it was coming. On the eve
of the arrival of the Cabinet Mission, in a sensational press state-
ment to a British newspaper, he warned the Attlee Government
‘against the betrayal of the 60 million Scheduled Castes of India in
order to appease the Caste Hindus’.103 The Working Committee of
the Federation in a meeting on 2 April also adopted a resolution
specifying their demands before the Cabinet Mission. India should
be made a self-governing country, the resolution stated, ‘in a manner
which . . . [would] not merely grant freedom to the Hindu majority
but will also free the minority communities and the Scheduled
Castes in particular from the tyranny of the majority community
. . .’. The ‘results of the Primary elections’, it further reiterated, had
‘conclusively proved’ that the Federation was the ‘only organisation’
which could ‘claim to speak for the Scheduled castes of India’. To
safeguard their interests in future, the resolution demanded three
‘fundamental’ conditions to be provided for and they are: ‘(1) the
provision for separate electorates; (2) provision for adequate repres-
entation in the Legislature, in the Executive and in the Services and
(3) provision for new and separate settlements’.104
Dr Ambedkar first met the Cabinet delegation as a Member of
the Viceroy’s Executive Council on 26 March 1946, when he reiter-
ated the necessity of adequate safeguards for the protection of
minority rights, to be designed by the minorities themselves, and
not by the Congress, which represented the majority community.105
During his subsequent meeting on 5 April, as a representative of
the Scheduled Caste Federation, he was more candid about such
safeguards. Before the British left, he argued, ‘they must ensure that
the new constitution guaranteed to the Scheduled Castes the ele-
mentary human rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’,
102 Note by Under Secretary of State, IOR: L/P&J/10/50. Ambedkar’s biographer
Dhananjay Keer, however, thinks that he was elected with the help of the Muslim
League. See his Dr. Ambedkar, Life and Mission, p. 382.
103 Dawn, 20 March 1946, Paper-clipping in Ambedkar Papers, File Nos. 1–3,
NMML.
104 Resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Scheduled Castes Fed-
eration passed at its meeting held in Delhi on 2nd April 1946. IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
105 Note of meeting between Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy’s Executive
Council on Tuesday, 26 March 1946, The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p. 9.
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and gave them the other safeguards they demanded. Of them, the
separate electorates were fundamental. He would not prefer a Con-
stituent Assembly either, for it would obviously be dominated by the
caste Hindus.106 Sir P. T. Rajan, the representative of the Justice
Party, also supported this demand for separate electorate for the
dalits, as without it, given the results of the recent elections, ‘the
Scheduled Castes did not stand a chance’.107
But it was during this time that the colonial government changed
its views on the question of representation and patronage. Unlike the
earlier occasion in 1942, when Cripps refused to see the members
of the Congress-supported Depressed Classes League, this time the
Cabinet delegation agreed to the request of the Congress president,
Abul Kalam Azad, to meet the representatives of the ‘Nationalist
Scheduled Castes or Congress Scheduled Castes’, along with the
‘Nationalist Muslims’.108 The delegation consisted of Jagjivan Ram,
Radhanath Das and Prithvi Singh Azad, who presented a Memor-
andum passed at a recent meeting of the Working Committee of
the League. It claimed, first of all, that the election results, ‘proved
beyond doubt the unrepresentative character of the Federation, and
showed that the majority view of the Scheduled Castes was repres-
ented by the All India Depressed Classes League’. Jagjivan Ram fur-
ther reiterated that ‘the Scheduled Caste masses considered them-
selves Hindus’, and that ‘their main disability was not religious or
social, but economic’.109
The Cabinet Mission also agreed with Ram. During their 5 April
meeting with Ambedkar, Lord Pethic-Lawrence had bluntly told him
that after the British had left India, the ‘party divisions would prob-
ably be on economic issues. Surely the Scheduled Castes would have
a better chance of getting their rights by allying themselves with the
left wing than by relying on the British who were about to hand over
106 Meeting between the Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on Friday, 5 April 1946 at 12 Noon, The Transfer of Power, Vol.
VII, pp. 144–7.
107 Note of Meeting between Sir S. Cripps, Mr. Alexander and Sir P. T. Rajan on
Wednesday 17 April 1946, The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, pp. 289–90.
108 Record of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Viscount
Wavell, and Maulana Azad on Wednesday, 3 April 1946 at 10 am, The Transfer of
Power, Vol. VII, p. 116; also, ‘Notes for meeting with other Representatives of the
Depressed Classes’, IOR: L/P&J/10/26.
109 Meeting between the Cabinet Delegation and Mr. Jagjivan Ram, Mr. Radha-
nath Das and Mr. Prithvi Singh Azad on Monday 8 April 1946 at 4 pm, The Transfer
of Power, Vol. VII, pp.170–1.
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power’.110 This shifting of colonial patronage at the final hour of
departure was also apparent in a note by G. E. B. Abell, the private
Secretary to the Viceroy:
We should not encourage minorities still to look to us. . . . we are in no
position to uphold them if they take a stand against the great majority of
their fellow citizens; e.g., we should do only harm in the long run by trying
to insist now on separate electorates for the Scheduled Castes as demanded
by the Ambedkarites. The treatment to be accorded to the minorities must
be left to the Constituent Assembly and the responsibility of that body
should not be blurred.111
This colonial mindset was formally revealed in May 1946 in the
Statement of the Cabinet Mission. It said that for the purposes of
electing the representatives of the Constituent Assembly, it was ‘suf-
ficient to recognise only three main communities in India, General,
Moslem and Sikh, the ‘‘General’’ Community including all persons
who are not Moslems or Sikhs’. The interests of the smaller minorit-
ies, such as the Scheduled Castes, would be looked after by an ‘Advis-
ory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities and tribal and
excluded areas’, which would have due representation of such inter-
ests.112 The position was further clarified on 18 July, when Sir
Stafford Cripps announced before the House of Commons that there
were ‘two claimants to represent’ the Depressed Classes. Of them,
‘Dr. Ambedkar’s organisation . . .[was] somewhat local in its charac-
ter, being mainly centred in Bombay and the Central Provinces; the
Congress affiliated organisation . . . [was] spread widely over the
whole country’.113 The Secretary of State conceded in the House of
Lords on the same day, that ‘owing to the operation of what is known
as the Poona Pact, they [Ambedkar’s party] have been almost
entirely excluded from the provincial assemblies’, and therefore
could not secure representation in the Constituent Assembly. But
the Depressed Classes, he reassured the House, would be having
‘their full representation through the Congress affiliated organis-
ation’, whose leaders were interviewed and he was ‘fully convinced
110 Meeting between the Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on Friday, 5 April 1946 at 12 Noon The Transfer of Power, Vol.
VII, pp. 146–7.
111 Note by G. E. B. Abell, 8 June 1946; IOR: 3/1/131.
112 INDIA (Cabinet Mission), Statement by the Cabinet Mission and His Excel-
lency the Viceroy, Presented by the Prime Minister to parliament . . . May 1946;
IOR: L/P&J/10/23.
113 Text of the speech by Sir Stafford Cripps at the Commons on July 18, 1946,
GI,Home (Political) File No. 51/2/1946, NAI.
S E K H A R B A N D Y O P A D H Y A Y922
of their very genuine and strong desire to support the case of the
Depressed Classes’. The proposed Advisory Committee on the
Minorities, he hoped, would provide for reasonable opportunities for
representing both the organizations.114
In the proposed Interim government too, the Scheduled Castes
were to be represented by the Congress. In a letter to Wavell on 3
May 1946, Ambedkar had demanded that ‘their representation in
the interim Government should be 50% of the representation
granted to the Muslims’.115 But the Viceroy, on the other hand, pro-
posed the formation of a Council with 12 portfolios, consisting of 5
Congress, including 1 Scheduled Caste, 5 Muslim League, 1 Sikh and
1 Anglo-Indian or 1 non-League Muslim.116 The Congress president
objected to the inclusion of the Scheduled Caste representation in
the Congress quota, as that would reduce the caste Hindu repres-
entation.117 The Viceroy thereafter proposed to include one Congress
Scheduled Caste member over and above the five Congress mem-
bers118 and wrote to the Congress president that the Interim Govern-
ment would be constituted ‘on the basis of Political Parties and not
Communities’. And six Congressmen to five Muslim Leaguers could
not be called ‘parity’.119 Jinnah objected to the Scheduled Caste
member being a Congress nominee. This was a device, he argued,
not to give real representation to the Scheduled Castes, but to give
an additional seat to the Congress.120 Pethic-Lawrence also regretted
that a member of the Ambedkarite Depressed Classes could not be
included in the Interim Government. Interestingly, the Viceroy com-
forted him by saying that although he sympathized with his views,
‘there was great difficulty in finding a competent administrator
114 Lords Debate on India: Text of Secretary of State’s Speech, GI, Home
(Political), File No. 51/2/1946, NAI.
115 Ambedkar to Wavell, 3 May 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
116 Record of Meeting between the Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Vis-
count Wavell on Friday, 3 May 1946 at 2.30pm, The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p.
403.
117 Record of meeting of Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Viscount Wavell
with Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru on Monday, 10 June 1946 at 12 noon, The
Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p. 856.
118 Telegram from Cabinet Delegation and Viceroy to Prime Minister, Index 70,
14 June 1946; IOR: L/P&J/10/23.
119 Telegram from Cabinet Delegation to Cabinet Offices, Index 75, 15 June
1946; IOR: L/P&J/10/23.
120 Note of Interview between Mr Jinnah, Lord Pethic-Lawrence and Mr Alex-
ander on Monday, 17 June 1946, The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, pp. 960–1; also,
Telegram from Cabinet Delegation to Cabinet Offices, Index 78, 20 June 1946;
IOR: L/P&J/10/23.
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among the followers of Dr. Ambedkar’. Strangely enough, only a year
ago he had no hesitation in recommending Ambedkar as a possible
member of his proposed new Executive Council. The First Lord then
urged that at least they should be included among the 12 members
of the Advisory Committee on the Minorities.121
As for the composition of the Advisory Committee, it was origin-
ally intended that its members would be elected by the Constituent
Assembly. To this Ambedkar wrote an angry rejoinder to V. P.
Menon, arguing that in such an arrangement, all the Scheduled
Caste members of the Committee would ‘represent the Congress
point of view’ and there would be no one to represent the Federation,
although the results of the primary elections provided ‘incontrovert-
ible proof’ of the latter’s representative character.122 The Cabinet
Mission ultimately accepted the formula suggested by Menon, of 3
Hindus, 3 Muslims, 2 Scheduled Castes, 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian,
1 Anglo-Indian and 1 Parsi, who were to be elected, in addition to
20 co-opted members.123 Among the co-opted members at least 6
would be Scheduled Castes, of whom two should represent the Sched-
uled Caste Federation.124
The composition of the Interim Government ran into further
trouble, when in addition to the demand for inclusion of Congress
Muslims, Maulana Azad also objected to the Viceroy’s proposal to
consult the Muslim League in filling up future vacancies in the
Scheduled Caste seat. The Viceroy’s contention, he argued,
restricted the Congress representation to Caste Hindus alone and
made it equal to that of the League.125 Finally, on 16 July the Viceroy
recommended that the proposed Interim Government would consist
of fourteen members, of whom six members, including a representat-
ive of the Scheduled Castes, would be nominated by the Congress,
five by the Muslim League and the three representatives of the
121 Record of the Meeting of Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Viscount
Wavell on 18 June 1946 at 10 am, The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p. 968.
122 Ambedkar to Menon, 19 June 1946; IOR: R/3/1/131.
123 Record of the Meeting of Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Viscount
Wavell on 21 June 1946 at 10 am, The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, p. 998; also, V. P.
Menon to G. E. B. Abell, 19 June 1946 and 20 June 1946, IOR: R/3/1/131.
124 Memorandum on the Advisory Committee on the Rights of Citizens, Minorit-
ies and Tribal and Excluded Areas; IOR: R/3/1/131.
125 Record of the meeting of the Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Viscount
Wavell with Representatives of the Congress Party on Sunday, 23 June 1946 at 2
pm., The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, pp. 1012–18; Telegram from Cabinet Delegation
to Cabinet Offices, Index 80, 25 June 1946; IOR: L/P&J/10/23.
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minorities would be nominated by the Viceroy himself.126 Jinnah
opposed straight away, as the proposal broke the principle of parity
and also let down the Scheduled Castes.127 Nehru, on the other hand,
agreed to send a provisional list of nominees, which included the
name of Jagjivan Ram, representing the Scheduled Castes.128 In the
new government Ram received the portfolio of Labour,129 ironically,
the same one held by Ambedkar in the previous Executive Council.
Thus Ambedkar and his All India Scheduled Castes Federation
were denied the right to represent the Scheduled Castes in any of
the public fora, except the Minority Commission, primarily because
of their debacle in the recent election. The election results, in other
words, became the chief criterion for determining the legitimacy of
representation. Ambedkar was indeed caught in his own trap. In a
letter to Kamalakant Chitre in 1944 he wrote that he was
researching on the question: ‘Does the Congress Represent the
Untouchables?’ His method to answer this question, he said, would
be to compile ‘the number of votes Congress secured all throughout
India against non-Congress Parties . . . in the elections of 1937’.
When a year later in 1945 his book (What Congress and Gandhi Have
Done to the Untouchables) appeared, chapter 6 did exactly that. It ana-
lysed the results of the election of 1937 and concluded that the Con-
gress claim to represent all the communities of India was ‘A False
Claim’. Ironically, a year later the same argument was used against
him. Although for Ambedkar the meaning of representation had now
shifted from being ‘electoral’ to ‘substansive’, the colonial mind had
moved in exactly the reverse direction.
The Response
The response of Ambedkar and the Federation to the Cabinet Mis-
sion decisions was predictably very bitter. The Working Committee
of the Federation met on 4 June at Bombay and demanded an imme-
diate amendment to the Cabinet Mission proposals. ‘Failing this’,
the committee warned, ‘there will be no alternative for the Sched-
126 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 July 1946, Wavell Collection,
Vol. 7, pp. 34–5.
127 Jinnah to Viceroy, 31 July 1946, Wavell Collection, Vol. 7, p. 75.
128 H. E. the Viceroy’s Interview with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on 17th August
1946, Wavell Collection, Vol. 7.
129 Press Note, 1 Sept. 1946, Wavell Collection, Vol. 8, p. 169.
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uled Castes but to resort to direct action’.130 Then, in a letter to
Clement Attlee on 1 July, Ambedkar argued that until the Simla
conference in 1945, the colonial government did recognize the
Scheduled Castes as separate from the Hindus and considered them
to be a distinct and important element in the national life of India
and therefore the Viceroy invited separate representatives from
the Federation. But the ‘Cabinet Mission have completely effaced
the Scheduled Castes as a separate entity’. So ‘in the name of the
Untouchables’, he appealed to the Labour government to amend the
proposals to recognize them as a minority, provide adequate safe-
guards for their rights before leaving India and to offer them at least
two positions in the Interim government.131 But when there was no
response within a week, P. N. Rajbhoj, the general secretary of the
Federation announced in a press statement on 9 July that: ‘The time
has arrived to launch a passive resistance movement . . . The circum-
stances require a struggle in order to save the Scheduled castes from
the impending catastrophe’. He also alleged that the Cabinet Mis-
sion decisions were the results of Congress machinations.132 The
movement had already been informally launched on 26 June when
the All India Congress Committee met at Bombay to ratify the
Working Committee’s resolutions on the Cabinet Mission proposals.
The members of the Scheduled Caste Federation staged a demon-
stration outside the hall. However, no major disturbances of the pro-
ceedings occurred at that time.133
The satyagraha actually began on 15 July when the Bombay Legis-
lative Council met at Poona. Defying the prohibitory orders of the
District Magistrate, hundreds of Federation demonstrators, includ-
ing some women, marched towards the Council Chamber, while
shouting slogans and waving black flags. On being stopped by the
police, they squatted on the road, while others, who could infiltrate
through the cordon, were arrested. It was reported that in order to
carry on the demonstration, volunteers were recruited from Bombay
city and neighbouring districts and were being taken to Poona.134
130 The All India Scheduled Caste Federation. Resolutions passed at the Meeting
of the Working Committee held at Bombay on 4th June 1946; IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
131 Ambedkar to Attlee, 1 July 1946; IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
132 News from India: Political Situation, Section No. 15, Serial No. 96, 16 July,
1946, GI, Home (Political), File No. 51/2/1946, NAI.
133 Fortnightly Report on the political situation in Bombay for the first half of
July 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/7/1946 Poll(I), NAI.
134 Fornightly Report for Bombay for the first half of July 1946, GI, Home
(Political) File No. 18/7/1946 Poll(I), NAI.
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Two days later at a press conference on 17 July, Ambedkar
announced that the movement would eventually become country-
wide and would assume the ‘same form of the struggle launched by
the Congress in August 1942’. This was, as he explained further, ‘a
protest against the breaking of every sort of promise given to the
Scheduled Castes by the British Government during the last 20
years’. So the movement would go on until they were accorded the
status of a minority and would take probably ‘a much more violent
form’. He made it clear, though, that: ‘We like this country to pro-
gress as much as anybody else does. . . . All we want is that our
position is safeguarded in the future India.’ To ensure that, after the
present Assembly session was over at Poona, the movement would
spread to other parts of the country and would take different forms.
But when asked whether or not he himself intended to offer satya-
graha personally, he retorted: ‘It is not necessary for a general to be
present on the battlefield. I have got trusted lieutenants who look
after the struggle . . .’.135
A few days later on 21 July at another press conference at Poona,
Ambedkar changed his target and directed his attack at the Con-
gress and demanded from it an open declaration of policies on how
it planned to safeguard the interest of the 60 million Scheduled
Castes in the future constitution of India. The movement would not
take place in the Muslim provinces of Punjab and Bengal, he
declared, as the Muslims had already acknowledged their demands.
And angrily repudiating a claim that the present agitation was
motivated by a sense of frustration, he retorted that in the last elec-
tion the Scheduled Castes ‘had won cent per cent victory, although
they had lost cent per cent seats’. It was the Poona Pact which was
responsible for the disenfranchisement of the 60 million untouch-
ables and therefore they now demanded its abrogation. The present
satyagraha, he claimed, had been conducted ‘on a high moral plane’;
but when the moral resources would be exhausted, they would have
recourse to ‘other means’. Before leaving Poona, the same evening
he addressed a largely attended public meeting of the dalits where
he declared that the struggle would be continued to ‘the bitterest
end’.136 The demonstration went on throughout the Assembly session
and processions of satyagrahis numbering from five hundred to one
135 News from India: Political Situation, Section No. 15, Serial No. 97, 23 July
1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 51/2/46, NAI.
136 Ibid.
D A L I T P O L I T I C S I N I N D I A , 1 9 4 5 – 4 7 927
thousand were taken out daily. Towards the end of the session, 1,119
satyagrahis were arrested and prosecuted.137
The movement gradually also spread to other provinces. In UP,
Ambedkar’s supporters tried to break up a Congress meeting at
Lucknow on 24 June and from 15 July launched a satyagraha against
the Cabinet Mission, the Congress and the Poona Pact. When the
Legislative Assembly commenced its session on 16 July, demonstra-
tions were held outside the Council Chambers and about 250 people
were arrested for defying prohibitory orders.138 In the Central Prov-
inces and Berar, on 18 July about 10,000 Mahars, under a Federa-
tion banner, staged a demonstration at Nagpore in front of the
Assembly Hall, when the Assembly was in session. Black flags were
waived and anti-Congress slogans were shouted. It was followed by a
public meeting, where speakers lamented how the loyalty of the
Mahars during the Quit India movement was rewarded by the Cab-
inet Mission by completely overlooking the claims of the Scheduled
Castes. The meeting expressed its no-confidence in the men elected
to the Constituent Assembly, demanded the abrogation of the Poona
Pact and appealed for volunteers for the non-violent satyagraha to
be launched in Nagpore.139 The Madras Scheduled Caste Federation
also contemplated starting a satyagraha movement similar to the
one started in Poona. At a public meeting on 28 July, N. Sivaraj,
the President of the organization, was urged to take necessary steps
towards that goal.140
But then on the same day, i.e., 28 July, the Poona satyagraha was
‘adjourned’, within less than a fortnight after its commencement.
The reason cited by the Satyagraha Committee was the sudden
adjournment of the Legislative Assembly session by the Congress
ministry, which made demonstration in front of the Council chamber
meaningless.141 Ambedkar engaged in inconclusive negotiations with
Sardar Patel and the Bombay Chief Minister S. K. Patil. When the
talks failed, there was again another demonstration before the AICC
137 Fortnightly Report for Bombay for second half of July 1946, GI, Home
(Political) File No. 18/7/1946 Poll(I), NAI.
138 Fortnightly Report for UP for the first half of July 1946, GI, Home (Political)
File No. 18/7/1946, NAI.
139 Fortnightly Report for Central Provinces and Berar for the second half of July
1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/7/1946, NAI.
140 Fortnightly Report for Madras for second half of July 1946, GI, Home
(Political) file No. 18/7/1946, NAI.
141 News from India: Political Situation, Section No. 15, Serial No. 98, 30 July
1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 51/2/1946, NAI.
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meeting at Wardha on 8 August; but nothing further happened.142
Ambedkar’s earlier threat of extending the movement to other areas
in such a contingency did not take effect either and he missed the
opportunity of proving, through direct action, his popular support.
This happened despite the fact that dalits everywhere had become
articulate, even militant, as their relations with caste Hindus had
been continually deteriorating in the recent past.
Prior to the launching of the Poona satyagraha, tension was
mounting between the dalits and caste Hindus in other parts of
Maharashtra. After about a month of respite, there was a reported
renewal of trouble between the two groups at Tarwadi in Mazagaon
on 2 July, leaving 30 people injured and a curfew order promul-
gated.143 To cite a few other examples, the dalits of Orissa, who
celebrated Ambedkar’s birthday in Cuttack with great fanfare on 14
April, accused the Congress in an open meeting of being ‘a capitalist
organisation’.144 In UP we come across signs of even more growing
militancy among the dalits, particularly among the Chamars. The
Commissioners of Meerut and Bareilly both reported in July an
increase of tension between them and the caste Hindus, like the
Rajputs, Gujars and Jats. In Saharanpur, the Chamars refused to
cultivate land unless they were paid adequate wages; in Pilbhit they
refused to carry dead bodies from Police Stations for post mortem
examination. The caste Hindus also retaliated: in Saharanpur they
refused to allow the Chamars to graze their cattle or cut wood. In a
village in Muzaffarpur district, a large number of Gujars attacked a
Chamar colony, leaving one dead and 70 injured. In Badaun two
people were killed in a clash between Chamars and Thakurs.145 It
was against this backdrop of inter-caste tension that the Satyagraha
of 15 July was launched in Lucknow.
In Nagpore the situation was even more tense. Here, a fracas
between the local Mahars and the Textile Workers’ Union resulted
in a serious riot on 12 April, the day on which the election for the
Nagpore Trade Labour Union constituency was taking place.
Although trouble was initially controlled by the police, rumour
142 Keer, Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission, p. 383.
143 Fortnightly Report for Bombay for the first half of July 1946, GI, Home
(Political) File No. 18/7/1946, NAI.
144 The Orissa Report for the second half of April 1946, GI, Home (Political) File
No. 18/4/1946, NAI.
145 Fortnightly Report for UP for the first half of July 1946, GI, Home (Political)
File No. 18/7/46, NAI.
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spread in the afternoon that the dalit candidate for the constituency
had been assaulted by two police constables. In response, a large
crowd of Mahars, armed with spears and lathis attacked a police
party and when the latter opened fire, one person was killed.146 Soon
the tension spread to Pulgaon, where a caste Hindu was stabbed by
a Mahar youth, and to Bhandara district, and continued for more
than a month.147 It was again rekindled by the middle of July when
the Mahars of Akola, armed with sticks and spears, participated in
a procession that ended in a meeting where Gandhi and the caste
Hindus were profusely abused. The tension that was gradually build-
ing up culminated in the Nagpore rally before the Assembly Hall on
18 July, which we have mentioned earlier.148 But before it could pro-
ceed any further, the movement itself was withdrawn. What appears
from this picture is the fact that the Scheduled Caste Federation
had failed to channel this growing anger of the dalits into an organ-
ized mass movement, which alone at that critical juncture of Indian
history could again establish the legitimacy of its representative
character. The failure was partly due to a lack of experience in
organizing a mass movement, and partly because of the absence of
an adequate organizational machinery that could co-ordinate such
an agitation across the vast subcontinent.
So it took about two months for the movement to be renewed
again and in the meanwhile the Interim Government had taken
office, with Jagjivan Ram representing the dalits in the new cabinet.
The government believed that the threat of agitation by Ambedkar’s
Federation was unlikely to ‘assume significant proportion’. The Fed-
eration had asked its members to renounce government titles in pro-
test and only N. Sivaraj was reported to have renounced his title of
Dewan Bahadur.149 On a grander scale, however, the Scheduled
Caste Federation of CP and Berar launched a satyagraha in Nagpore
on 2 September, as the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly
resumed its postponed budget session. Initially the modus operandi was
to bring in batches of three to ten people into the Assembly Chamber
146 Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of
April 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/4/1946, NAI.
147 Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the second half of
April 1946 and first half of July 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/4/1946 and
18/7/46, NAI.
148 Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the second half of
July 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/7/46, NAI.
149 Government of India, Information and Arts Department, to Secretary of State
for India, 30 Aug. 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/104.
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for shouting anti-government and anti-Congress slogans and
courting arrest. When the Chamber was cordoned off, the satyagraha
deteriorated into a series of violent demonstrations involving young
people, and also some women, who were brought from the neigh-
bouring districts to participate in the demonstration. Daily arrests
ranged between one and four hundred, culminating in the police
resorting to a lathi-charge on 18 September to disperse the crowd.
And while this was going on outside the Council Chamber, inside,
the Congress Harijan MLA was condemning the sinister motives of
the Federation in organizing the satyagraha and the Congress Minis-
ter for Information was paying tribute to the Magistrate and the
police for showing tact and forbearance in tackling the situation.150
The movement, however, continued for another fortnight, during
which altogether 7,777 people were arrested and were released sub-
sequently. The policy of releasing the prisoners in the evening was
changed when on 26 September some of the released prisoners
became unruly. In the following three days, 947 people, including 11
women, were arrested and were held in custody. Eventually, all but
180 sought release on signing personal bonds. Those who preferred
to remain in jail were the top leaders, like Rao Bahadur G. M.
Thaware or Dashrath Patil.151 But although the Nagpore satyagraha
thus died down, tension in other parts of the province continued for
some time. In November, three Mahar boys in Pulgaon were reported
to have assaulted a Brahman boy for apparently no reason. Then on
the dasehra day, the photos of Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal
Nehru, which were being carried in a procession, were seized by some
Mahar boys and torn into pieces. A few days later some Mahars
clashed with a section of caste Hindu workers in a local mill and the
officials blamed it on ‘the recent spate of speech making’ by the
Federation leaders in the vicinity. Even this sporadic tension gradu-
ally calmed down, and so when in late November the Congress Hari-
jan MLAs held a convention in Pulgaon with Jagjivan Ram in the
chair, there was no hostile demonstration to break the tranquillity
of the place.152
150 Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of
Sept. 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/9/46, NAI.
151 Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the second half of
Sept. 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/9/46, NAI.
152 Fortnightly Report for the Central Provinces and Berar for the first and
second half of November 1946, GI, Home (Political) File No. 18/11/1946, NAI.
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When his lieutenants were fighting on the ground, Ambedkar was
trying his old method of arguing his case once again before the Brit-
ish government. He wrote a long Memorandum on the ‘Cabinet Mis-
sion and the Untouchables’, in which he outlined what he thought
the most obvious flaws in the Cabinet Mission statement. The first
blatant mistake was of course the non-recognition of the untouch-
ables as ‘a separate and distinct element in the national life of India’.
This was a ‘serious departure’ from the policies pursued so far by
the government with regard to the untouchables. The other ‘great
mistake’ was to adopt the results of the election as the sole criterion
for ‘assessing the representative character of the Congress’. The
election was fought on the issue of independence, not the future
constitution of India. And then again, the results of the final election
were ‘beyond the control of the Untouchables’, because the great
majority of them were not voters. On the contrary, in the Primary
election, ‘only 20 percent of the votes polled . . . were cast in favour
of Congress and 72 percent against it’. The untouchables could not
put up candidates in all the constituencies because of their ‘inability
. . . to bear the expense of double election’ and their relative inex-
perience in election management. And finally, the Cabinet Mission
was wrong in thinking that Ambedkar’s influence was confined only
to Bombay and the Central Provinces. This could be proved by citing
his election to the Constitutional Assembly from the Bengal Provin-
cial Legislative Assembly, where he ‘topped the poll so far as the
general seats were concerned, beating even Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose,
the leader of the Congress Party’. This was the main content of a
long letter which he sent to Clement Attlee on 12 August 1946,153
in a bid to reopen his case and undo the damage done by the Cabinet
Mission.
But Ambedkar was fighting a battle that had already been lost. In
a confidential telegram to the Secretary of State, the Governor of
Bengal described his statement as ‘both incorrect and somewhat
ingenuous’. Given the method of proportional representation with
single transferable vote, each candidate in the Bengal legislature
needed four votes to be elected to the Constituent Assembly. In the
case of Ambedkar, he received five, the fifth one actually being
wasted. The Congress whip, on the other hand, evenly distributed
their votes. But actually Bose and one other Congress nominee got
153 Ambedkar to Attlee, 12 Aug. 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
S E K H A R B A N D Y O P A D H Y A Y932
five votes; so there was no question of Ambedkar beating him.154 The
British Government conceded that the present electoral system
acted against the Scheduled Caste voters; but that did not explain
why the Federation would not be able to field candidates in more
than 22 seats only. ‘When all is said’, noted a confidential note, ‘. . .
the figures do not support Dr Ambedkar’s claim that his Federation
commands a substantial majority of the Scheduled Caste voters in
the country and is therefore the only body truly representative of the
Scheduled Castes.’155 The other reason for not upsetting the balance
was of course the apprehension of Congress displeasure. The Secret-
ary of State, therefore, wrote in his minute to the Prime Minister
on 9 September 1946: ‘I still feel that we should not volunteer a
pronouncement in response to Dr Ambedkar’s request for a public
declaration that the Scheduled Castes are a minority . . . To do so
would almost certainly arouse a controversy with Gandhi . . .’.156
So when Ambedkar went to London in October in order to per-
suade the Attlee government, its mind had already been cast. In
the meanwhile, Jogendranath Mandal, a Scheduled Caste MLA from
Bengal, a supporter of Ambedkar, and a member of the Executive
Committee of the Federation, had been nominated to the Interim
Government by Jinnah as a League representative. This was in retali-
ation to the Congress including a nationalist Muslim in its own
quota. But in such circumstances, as the government thought,
Ambedkar could ‘hardly complain that the Scheduled Castes . . .
[were] insufficiently represented in the Interim Government’.157 But
Ambedkar had enough grounds for complaining, as Mandal seemed
to be more keen on pleasing his patron than serving his community.
In a press interview on 17 October, he said that his ‘first duty’ was
to the Muslim League. ‘Secondly’ he would work for the whole coun-
try and only ‘Thirdly’ would he work for the betterment of the Sched-
uled Castes.158 So Ambedkar in a press statement from London
referred to his nomination as ‘wet-nursing’. This was followed by a
warning issued in India by P. N. Rajbhoj, the General Secretary of
154 Confidential Code Telegram from Governor of Bengal to Secretary of State
for India, 29 Aug. 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
155 Confidential Brief for Dr Ambedkar’s visit to UK, 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
156 Secretary of State’s Minute, Serial No. 51/46, 9 Sept. 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/
50.
157 Confidential Brief for Dr Ambedkar’s visit to UK, 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
158 Statement by Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Mandal: Information Department, India
Office, Telegram A3563 from the Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 18 October
1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/50.
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the Federation, to recommence satyagraha in order to have separate
electorates for the Scheduled Castes.159 Ambedkar came back from
London empty-handed, and on his return reiterated once again his
demand for separate electorates and expressed his belief that the
British parliament before transferring power would take steps to
ascertain the wishes of the minorities, regardless of what happened
in the Constituent Assembly. Rajagopalachari condemned him for
his ‘defeatist philosophy of segregation’ and it received wide publi-
city, as the mood of the majority of the nation was changing fast,
with the inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly drawing
nearer.160
So the satyagraha was renewed again on 25 March 1947. This
time the UP Scheduled Caste Federation started sending batches of
protesters to demonstrate in front of the Council Chamber against
the Congress Ministry and in demand for a separate electorate.
Defiance of prohibitory orders resulted in arrests, which in the first
four days rose to 196, including some women.161 The movement in
this way went on for fifteen days, resulting in the arrest of a number
of front-ranking leaders. And then on 18 April, P. N. Rajbhoj himself
led a batch of 75 passive resisters and courted arrest. On the eve of
his arrest, he issued a press statement criticizing the Congress Min-
istry and alleging harassment of his community by the caste Hindus.
About 550 passive resisters had been arrested already since the
beginning of the movement.162 But all these were of no avail as the
satyagrahis were swimming against the dominant political tide.
Their protest against the Congress at a time when the country was
patiently waiting for transfer of power and freedom, was most likely
to be misunderstood. The leaders of the Federation tried in vain to
dispel the distrust of the nation, as it was evident from the following
press statement of Piare Lal Kureel, a member from UP of the
Working Committee of the All India Scheduled Caste Federation. It
was issued on 28 April, when the UP satyagraha was still on and
Kureel was in prison.
It is wrong to think that the Scheduled Castes are against the Congress
demand for political freedom or that they want to defeat the so-called pop-
159 Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department, to Secretary
of State, 1 Nov. 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/104.
160 Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department, to Secretary
of State, 21 Nov. 1946, IOR: L/P&J/10/104.
161 The Pioneer, 26 March, 30 March 1947.
162 The Pioneer, 19 Arpil 1947.
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ular Government. They are equally patriotic and democratic in their out-
look. Their demands are just and are not opposed to the principles of social
justice and constitutional democracy. I earnestly ask the Government to try
to understand them.163
But the appeal was of no avail, as the mind of the majority of
Indians had already been cast in a mould created by the transfer
of power process. Rajbhoj was eventually sentenced to six months’
imprisonment, which provoked a barrage of protests from various
local Scheduled Caste organizations across the country.164 But there
was no protest or expression of sympathy from any other quarter.
On the contrary, there was condemnation in the press that dalit
leaders like Ambedkar were ‘insincere’ to the cause of ‘freedom of
India’.165 This was in sharp contrast to the image of his adversary,
Jagjivan Ram, the President of the Congress-affiliated All India
Depressed Classes League, who had been telling the pressmen that
it was incorrect to suggest that the Scheduled Castes were not
Hindus and therefore entitled to special minority rights. He ‘sup-
ported India’s liberation movement because . . . unless foreign dom-
ination is liquidated, there can be no peace and prosperity in the
country’. In widely shared popular perception, as opposed to Ambed-
kar’s ‘separatist’ line, he appeared to be offering an ‘assimilative
organisation’ and promising a future when untouchability would
completely vanish and the gulf between the caste Hindus and the
Scheduled Castes would be bridged.166 Ram, who could thus purpose-
fully blend his anti-colonialism with social welfarism, was thus more
in tune with the mood of the day than his political opponent.
Reconciliation and After
It was, therefore, time for reconciliation. Now it was only through
co-operation with the Congress and through his contributions to the
163 The Pioneer, 28 April 1947.
164 One could mention among them, the Rae Barali, Hamirpur and Jhansi district
Scheduled Caste Federations in UP, dalit meetings in Chanda, Wardha, Yeotmal
and Bhandara in C.P. and Berar, as well as Berar Provincial Scheduled Caste Fed-
eration. See letters from these organizations in GI, Reforms Office, File No. 41/10/
47-R, Part I and Part II, NAI.
165 From Prusottam Dass Kureel, General Secretary, UP Chamar Mahasabha, to
Viceroy, nd, GI, Reforms Office File No. 41/26/47-R, NAI.
166 News from India: Political Situation, Section No. 15, Serial No. 98, 30 July
1946, GI, Home (Political), File No. 51/2/1946, NAI.
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working of the Constituent Assembly that Ambedkar could serve his
community. So from the end of the year 1946, the dalit representat-
ives began to show greater friendliness towards the Congress and
the Constituent Assembly, and there was also greater moderation in
the proceedings of the Working Committee of the Scheduled Caste
Federation. Ambedkar supported the part of Nehru’s resolution
which set out the Objectives of the Constituent Assembly.167 And
then on 17 December, while responding to Jayakar’s amendment to
Nehru’s resolution, he delivered a remarkable speech which signified
a total turn around:
. . . I know to-day we are divided politically, socially and economically. We
are in warring camps, and I am probably one of the leaders of a warring
camp. But with all this I am convinced that given time and circumstances,
nothing in the world will prevent this country from becoming one, and with
all our castes and creeds, I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that
we shall in some form be a united people.168
His biographer Dhanajay Keer rightly observes: ‘Few speeches have
given such a turn to the life of a speaker.’ It was indeed a significant
day in the career of Ambedkar. ‘The sacrileger had become now a
counsel’, Keer goes on, ‘the scoffer had become a friend who cast a
spell on the Congressmen’.169
Around this time Ambedkar was also reported to have met L. B.
Bhopatkar, the President-elect of the Hindu Mahasabha, to discuss
the possible means of ‘effecting a rapprochement between caste
Hindus and members of the Scheduled Castes’. The issue was going
to be discussed in the forthcoming Gorakhpur session of the Maha-
sabha, for which Ambedkar supposedly conveyed ‘certain proposals’
to the Mahasabha leader.170 The necessary background for this rap-
prochement was possibly provided by the series of social reforms that
followed during this period, including a number of temples being
opened for the dalits. The Congress also took on board an active
legislative programme in various provinces for removing social disab-
ilities for the dalits and for ensuring for them entry into the Hindu
167 Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department, to Secretary
of State, 4 Feb. 1947, IOR: L.P&J/10/104.
168 Quoted in Jay Bheem (Madras), 1 January 1947, Paper-clipping in Ambedkar
Papers, File No. 1–3, NMML.
169 Keer, Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission, p. 389.
170 Jay Bheem (Madras), 1 Jan. 1947, Paper-clipping, Ambedkar Papers, File No.
1–3, NMML.
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temples.171 And finally, when Bengal was partitioned and Ambedkar
lost his seat in the Constituent Assembly, the Congress offered him
the seat from Bombay, vacated by Dr Jayakar in April. When in July
he returned to Constituent Assembly, this time from Bombay with
Congress support, he was greeted with loud cheers.172 His subsequent
appointment as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Constitution, and later as the Labour Minister in the first Nehru
Cabinet, completed the reconiliation process.173
But reconciliation was doubtful from the very beginning and ran
into rough waters within a few months. As he had apprehended earl-
ier, it was difficult for Ambedkar to work with the champions of
Hindu orthodoxy operating from within the Congress. By May 1948,
his feud with Patel and Pant came into the open and he proposed
to resign.174 Ultimately, he resigned from the Cabinet in October
1951, owing to his irreconcilable differences with some of the Con-
gress stalwarts over the Hindu Code Bill.175 This was the final parting
of the ways and also another major moment of crisis for dalit politics.
The first election in independent India was approaching and the
Congress was still being looked on as the liberator and therefore was
sure to win. As long as Ambedkar was in the Cabinet, the Bombay
Provincial Congress Committee was considering the idea of having
an electoral alliance with his Scheduled Caste Federation.176 This
would have certainly ensured success for its candidates in the coming
election. But the moment he resigned, the whole scenario changed.
Not only was the alliance called off, but the Congress now decided
to put up a candidate against him and proposed to mobilize all the
171 Among the achievements of Congress around this time, one could mention
the Orissa Removal of Civil Disabilities Act, 1946, Madras Temple Entry Authoris-
ation Act, 1947, Madras Removal of Civil Disabilities (Amendment) Act, 1947, the
United Provinces Removal of Social Disabilities Act, 1947, etc. The texts of these
acts may be found in GI, Home (Political), File Nos. 13/3/47, 13/5/47, 13/8/47, 13/
12/47, NAI.
172 Government of India, Information and Broadcasting department, to Secretary
of State, 19 July 1947, IOR: L/P&J/10/104.
173 His biographer Dhananjay Keer thinks that his inclusion in the cabinet was
due to the intervention of Sardar Patel, S. K. Patil, Acharya Donde and Nehru.
Gandhi only gave his assent when the proposal was presented before him by Nehru.
See Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission, pp. 396, 439.
174 Ambedkar to Kamalakant Chitre, 5 May 1948, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Papers,
NAI.
175 For a detailed discussion of Ambedkar’s differences with the Congress at this
stage, see Dhananjay Keer, Dr. Ambedkar, Life and Mission, pp. 426–36.
176 Bombay State Election Co-ordination Committee, Draft Minutes of the meet-
ing of July 30 [1951], Bombay P.C.C. Papers, Subject Files No. 9, NMML.
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resources necessary to ensure his defeat. Ambedkar accepted the
challenge, decided to contest the election from the Bombay Parlia-
mentary constituency and asked Kamalakant Chitre to ‘set up an
organisation’.177
The election campaign of 1951 is important for understanding
dalit politics of this period and of the recent past. At an election
meeting at Jullunder on 27 October 1951, Ambedkar explained
his relationship with the Congress during the four years of his
ministerial career. ‘I remained independent while in the Congress
Government’, he declared. ‘Many people thought that I had joined
the Congress Party as I had accepted the Cabinet Ministership of
the Congress Government’. But, ‘earth and stone are two different
things’, he added, ‘and they can never mix together’. He did not
join the Congress Party because he thought it was never a party
with genuine sympathy for the Scheduled Caste people.178 Such
bitterness and sense of frustration even after more than four years
of close co-operation from within the cabinet is worth a serious
consideration. It shows clearly that the alliance was never a happy
one and not without conflict, as became evident with the row over
the Hindu Code Bill. And the frustration was also natural, as
barring the constitutional prohibition of untouchability and the
provision of reservation, no other tangible steps had been taken
for the protection of the dalits. ‘Had there been any possibility of
getting our grievances redressed in the Congress, I would not have
left the organisation’, he declared at another meeting the following
day at Ludhiana. But why, in the first place, did he join the
Congress cabinet and resign subsequently? Was it for personal
ambitions alone, as alleged recently by Arun Shourie?179 What
Ambedkar said in this regard at the same Ludhiana meeting is
worth pondering:
If I wanted I could remain in the Congress for ever and would have defin-
itely got a good place there. But I would have done only if I had selfish
motives and not any regard for my community. I would have remained
there, if I was in need of any licence or permit for myself. The man seeking
licences and permits can do so at the expense of his community. This is the
177 Ambedkar to Kamalakant Chitre, 23 Oct. 1951, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Papers,
NAI.
178 Speech delivered by Baba Sahib Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on 27th October 1951
at Ramdass Pur, Jullunder during his Tour of Punjab (I), Ambedkar Papers, File
Nos. 1–3, NMML.
179 Shourie, Worshipping False Gods, pp. 56–8.
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experience I have gained during the period I remained in the Congress
Government.180
The next day at another meeting at Patiala he reiterated the same
argument. ‘Had I wished, I would have continued as a Minister in the
Government for the whole of my life but I have no selfish motives. So
I have left the Congress Government as I think I cannot serve my
community while remaining there.’ It is difficult to deny the obvious
truth in Ambedkar’s statements. The Congress government, he
believed, had failed to deliver the goods. There was ‘no food, no
clothes and no shelter’ for the poor people. The condition of the
dalits had deteriorated under its regime. The reservation was only
for ten years. He wanted it to remain until untouchability was totally
eradicated; but that did not happen because of Congress opposition.
And so, when the reservation would be gone, he apprehended, the
caste Hindus would again call the dalits ‘Chamars and Bhangis’. So
it was absolutely necessary for them to unite under the banner of
the Scheduled Caste Federation.181
But the election was fought on entirely different issues. Congress
was still the liberator, the only champion of a triumphant Indian
nationalism, and therefore it swept the elections in 1952.182 Out of
489 Lok Sabha seats, Congress won 364, while Ambedkar could only
see his lieutenant P. N. Rajbhoj elected. The Federation also got one
seat in the Bombay Assembly and one in Hyderabad.183 Ambedkar
himself fared badly in the Bombay parliamentary consituency, being
defeated by a political nonentity. He could not take the defeat very
lightly. ‘Either the voting has been manipulated’, he wrote to Kama-
lakant Chitre, ‘. . . or that the Bombay city has genuinely voted for
the Congress. If the latter is true it is a sad reflection on the intelli-
gence of the Bombay citizens . . . The Bombay city seems to me to
have become terribly degraded city.’184 He thought of a conspiracy
theory too: ‘the plot to defeat me’, he wrote again to Chitre four
180 Speech delivered by Baba Sahib Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on 28th October 1951
at Ludhiana during his tour of Punjab, Ambedkar Papers, File Nos. 1–3, NMML.
181 Speech delivered by Baba Sahib Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on 29th October 1951
at Patiala during his tour of Punjab, Ambedkar Papers, File Nos. 1–3, NMML.
182 It is pertinent here to mention a proverb I remember from my childhood days
in Calcutta in the 1960s. It said that even a lamp-post would win the election if it
contested on a Congress ticket.
183 Shourie, Worshipping False Gods, p. 58. Dhananjay Keer, Dr. Ambedkar: Life and
Mission, p. 440.
184 Ambedkar to Kamalakant Chitre, 14 January 1952, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar
Papers, NAI.
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days later, ‘was hatched by Dange and Savarkar who was inflamed
by my proposal to partition Kashmir’.185
But his chief election agent, Kamalakant Chitre, was much more
dispassionate in diagnosing the causes of this catastrophe. On the
whole, he calculated, Ambedkar must have got not more than 60%
of the Scheduled Caste votes, because ‘many . . . were not voters and
many being voters were not traceable’. The latter situation indicated
another major weakness. The ‘foremost’ cause of defeat, as Chitre
identified it, was ‘the lack of organisation, capable of establishing
contact with the voters outside the S. C. section’. In short, as he
lamented: ‘Our own organisation was a tattered one. Practically
there is nothing except your name, but for which we would have
been nowhere’.186 But apart from organization, if we also look at the
programme of the Federation, we would find that it had very little
on offer to attract the masses. The Election Manifesto stated boldly
that the Federation was not ‘a communal organisation’; its major
concern was ‘the benefit of all the down-trodden humanity in India’.
But for these people the kind of education it proposed was ‘not prim-
ary education, not even Secondary education. What it ha[d] in mind
. . . [was] advanced education of such high order, both in this country
and outside, which . . . [would] enable these classes to fit themselves
for taking hold of administration’. And as a complementary measure
to this, it proposed reservation in all civil and military services, sub-
ject only to minimum qualification. The problem of poverty was dia-
gnosed to be ‘a double edged problem’. On the one hand, it was a
problem of production in agriculture and industry, and on the other,
a problem of ‘excessive growth of population’. Interestingly, it was
not considered to be a problem of distribution! ‘The problem of land-
less labourers’, the Manifesto suggested, ‘could be solved by settling
them in reclaimed waste land . . .’; the fifteen-page document con-
tained no reference to land reform.187 Such a programme could
appeal to an emerging dalit middle class. But however much Ambed-
kar might criticize Congress for ignoring the masses, his election
manifesto could hardly expect to become an alternative draw card
185 Ambedkar to Kamalakant Chitre, 18 January 1952, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar
Papers, NAI.
186 Unsigned letter [presumably from Kamalakant Chitre] to Ambedkar, 14 Jan-
uary 1952, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Papers, NAI.
187 Election Manifesto of the All India Scheduled Caste Federation, Ambedkar
Papers, File No. 3–9, Part 1, Roll No. 2, NMML. M. S. Gore, however, reads this
Manifesto in a different way. See his The Social Context, pp. 190–3.
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for the mass of voters in an election based on universal adult franch-
ise. These two limitations—that of organization and programme—
were the perennial problems that haunted dalit politics ever since
its inception. And it was these problems which ultimately precipit-
ated its final crisis, threatening its autonomy, towards the end of the
colonial era, notwithstanding the undoubted qualities and commit-
ments of the leadership.
Conclusion
One major political result of the transfer of power in India was the
marginalization, at least temporarily, of all other minority identities,
except those defined by religion, such as the ‘Moslem’ or ‘Sikh’. It
also resulted in a hegemonic power of the Congress, which was
bestowed with the privilege of representing all other Indians—the
‘General’ population. The Congress contested the minority constitu-
encies as well and claimed to represent them all. Ambedkar and his
All India Scheduled Caste Federation were helplessly caught in this
paradigm. Although until 1945 the colonial state recognized them
as a distinct community with claims to separate political rights and
representation, the Cabinet Mission curtly told them to look towards
the Congress for their future protection and welfare. To put it in a
different way, the main thrust of the transfer of power process was
to depoliticize caste and push it into the social or religious domain.
This amounted indeed to a total negation of a powerful colonial dis-
course on caste developed since the late nineteenth century and an
abrupt reversal of the erstwhile dominant trend in colonial policies
on representation and franchise, followed since the early years of the
twentieth. Ambedkar and other dalit leaders were hardly prepared
for this sudden portentous shift and could do nothing to reverse this
political process. They had to remain satisfied with only a token rep-
resentation for their Federation in the Advisory Committee on the
minorities, in a similar way as Jinnah had to remain content with a
moth-eaten Pakistan.
But Ambedkar and the dalit leadership were also partly respons-
ible for this predicament. The dismal state of their organizational
network and the lack of a popular support base were pathetically
revealed when they needed them most to establish their substantive
representative character. Ambedkar’s naı¨ve hope that he would give
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a clarion call and people would mobilize,188 did not actualize at times
of need. To use his own analogy, his ill-equipped ‘lieutenants’ failed
the ‘general’ at the crucial moment of crisis. Ambedkar himself had
become detached from the ground realities of dalit politics. Ever
since he became a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, he
had very little time for organizational work. This detachment
increased, as the local dalit leaders complained, when he became a
minister in the Nehru cabinet.189 In the meantime, dalit politics,
which never represented a united front, had started moving further
in different directions.
From 1937 onwards, the Congress-supported Depressed Classes
League had been specifically focusing on the mobilization of dalit
voters at the grassroots level on the basis of an integrationist reform
programme. However faulty that mobilization drive might have
been, the result was a sweeping victory for the Congress Scheduled
Caste candidates in the election of 1946. At the other end of the
spectrum, in the 1940s, the Communists on a much more radical
note were mobilizing the dalit poor peasants and sharecroppers in
both eastern and southern India. As a result, the dalits became the
major participants in two of the most violent peasant revolts of the
late colonial period, the Tebhaga movement in Bengal190 and the
Telengana movement in Andhra.191 In other words, when Ambedkar
and his Federation were lobbying the British government for consti-
tutional protection, the Congress and the Communists were gradu-
ally eroding their support base at the grassroots level.
This ‘process of co-optation and incorporation’ of the dalit move-
ments throughout India, as Gail Omvedt has described the scen-
ario,192 was made possible, as one has to admit, by the absence of an
alternative organization or programme, forthcoming from Ambedkar
and his Federation. While Ambedkar was condemning the Congress
for preaching conformity with its own ideology, he too was refusing
to recognize the pluralist nature of dalit politics in the India of the
188 Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution, p. 315.
189 Ibid.
190 For more details, see, Adrienne Cooper, Sharecropping and Sharecroppers’
Struggles in Bengal 1930–1950 (Calcutta, 1988),passim; and Bandyopadhyay, Caste,
Protest and Identity in Colonial India, pp. 229–37.
191 For more details see, D. N. Dhanagare, Peasant Movements in India 1920–1950
(Delhi, 1991), pp. 180–212; Gail Omvedt, however, thinks that Marxist claims that
the dalits constituted the ‘main force’ of the dalams are only ‘examples of romanti-
cism’. Dalits and the Democratic Revolution, pp. 311–12.
192 Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution, p. 326.
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1940s. This refusal left him ill-prepared to confront his adversaries
politically, with an ideologically integrated alternative organization
and a programme more appealing to the dalit masses. In the political
environment of the time, when the dominant mood of the people and
all other political parties was to achieve and enjoy the long-awaited
freedom, any statement of concern for citizens’ rights in a future
state needed to be blended with anti-colonialism, in order to capture
popular imagination. It was here that the dalit Federation failed and
the result was the elimination of what Ambedkar imagined to be a
viable third force in the troubled Indian politics of the 1940s.
